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The fallout from the Watergate scandals has had a profound effect
upon the legal profession because many of the prominent offenders
were attorneys. The severity of the conduct involved and the suspicion
that the activities publicized represent merely the tip of the iceberg'
have caused the American Bar Association, state and local bar com-
mittees, and law schools to seek new ways of educating prospective
lawyers with respect to their ethical duties, and to seek more effective
sanctions against ethically deficient attorneys. 2 It is ironic, however,
that increased awareness and activity in the area of legal ethics should
be motivated by Watergate, because no course in ethics, no better
program of discipline, no keener awareness of moral issues would
have succeeded in altering the conduct of the principle offenders
where the criminal laws and their personal moral values failed to deter
their activities. Nevertheless, the impetus to re-examine approaches to
the teaching of professional responsibility and re-evaluate the princi--
ples and objectives of the governing rules of legal ethics should not be
lost, for the legal profession's record in the education and enforcement
of professional responsibility has been unsatisfactory.3
* B.A., 1969, University of Virginia; J.D., 1973, University of Pennsylvania; As-
sistant Professor of Law, University of Washington. The author gratefully acknowl-
edges the contribution of Professor Barbara Babcock, Stanford Law School, to the
concepts and hypothetical problems described in this article.
1. See, e.g., 19 AM. B. NEWS, Sept., 1974, at 3 (remarks of ABA President James
Fellers); 19 AM. B. NEWS, Mar., 1974, at 8 (remarks of former ABA President
Chesterfield Smith); Tunney, The Erosion of Regard for Legal Profession, Los An-
geles Times, May 19, 1974, pt. VI, at 6, col. 1 (excerpts from talk given at Harvard
Law School Forum). See generally ABA SPECIAL COMMITrEE ON EVALUATION OF Dis-
CIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY EN-
FORCEMENT (Final Draft, 1970) (Clark Committee Report).
2. It should be noted that the interest in finding more effective ways of teaching
Professional Responsibility is not a new development. See, e.g., EDUCATION IN THE
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LAWYER (D. Weckstein ed. 1970) (Proceedings
of the National Conference on Education in the Professional Responsibilities of the
Lawyer, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado, June 10-13, 1968).
3. See generally Pincus, One Man's Perspective on Ethics and the Legal Profession,
12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 279 (1975); Thomforde, Public Opinion of the Legal Profes-
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To date, no method of instruction in professional responsibility has
achieved substantial success in raising the level of awareness or in-
creasing the ability of students and attorneys to resolve ethical di-
lemmas arising in the multifaceted practice of law. 4 This failure is in
part a function of the present inability to bridge the gap between aca-
demic discussion of ethical rules and principles in the classroom and
actual recognition of ethical issues in applying those principles in the
complex, pressure-filled practice of law. The first part of this article
advocates a mode of professional responsibility instruction designed to
remedy this defect by combining aspects of traditional teaching
methods with student involvement in simulated problems.
The failure of the Bar to regulate effectively the ethical conduct of
its members is not solely the failure of law school teaching meth-
odology. A much more serious deficiency-and one far more difficult
to resolve--concerns the way lawyers perceive and attempt to enforce
professional responsibility. Instead of providing an analytical frame-
work which the individual lawyer can employ in considering problems
arising in practice, the legal profession has chosen a series of ambig-
uous and only tangentially related rules which are often contradictory
or misleading. Because these situation-oriented rules do not clearly
encompass even a majority of the myriad factors potentially relevant
in resolving a particular ethical dilemma, the Bar has found itself
unable to agree upon the proper course of conduct in any but the
most obvious cases, making it virtually impossible to control the ac-
tions of attorneys acting in good faith. The existing situation-oriented
rules are unworkable and unenforceable. Effective instruction in and
enforcement of professional responsibility requires a system model of
legal ethics. The second part of this article describes system-oriented
sion: A Necessary Response by the Bar and the Law School, 41 TENN. L. REv. 503
(1974); Tunney, Is the Bar Meeting Its Ethical Responsibilities?, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REv.
245 (1975).
4. See Thielens, The Influence of the Law School Experience on the Professional
Ethics of Law Students, 21 J. LEGAL ED. 587 (1969). presenting empirical data meas-
uring changes in ethical responses of students from four law schools in the Class of
1964:
On the average, . . . the class was just 6.4% more likely to adopt an ethical
stance at graduation than it had been at entrance. This would mean that if all
ethical positions had changed equally at all schools, each class at each school
would have a net addition of thirteen more members out of each 200 graduates
adhering to each value than had at entrance.
Id. at 591. The average percentage of ethical replies to the questionnaires increased
from 54.4% at entrance to 60.8% at graduation. Id. at 592. The study is discussed
further in Weckstein, Watergate and the Law Schools, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 261, 267
(1975).
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models and how such models can aid practicing lawyers and law stu-
dents in resolving ethical questions.
I. TEACHING PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
The debate as to whether professional responsibility is a subject
which can be taught effectively by law schools has been short-cir-
cuited by Watergate and the resulting public reaction to the legal pro-
fession. Public pressure alone mandates law school education on the
subject. However, certain of the skeptics' arguments warrant mention.
First, legal ethics has been perceived by many as dependent upon the
individual lawyer's conscience and moral responsibility. 5 Such ethical
precepts are formed long before law school matriculation. Thus, it is
argued, a formal course in professional responsibility is either unnec-
essary or ineffective in causing attorneys to "do the right thing" in any
given situation. This analysis is unsound because it ignores the crucial
differences between professional and personal ethics. Even assuming
that a student will have developed a personal moral perspective prior
to entering law school, knowledge of what the legal profession con-
siders to be professionally ethical is an entirely different matter.6 For
example, a lawyer may not violate any personal moral code by com-
mingling his client's and his own funds or property, but failure to
comply strictly with the dictates of the American Bar Association's
5. One of the Conference Reporters for the Legal Education Course at the 1968
National Conference on Education in the Professional Responsibilities of the Lawyer
noted that at the conference "[t] he most commonly heard detracting expression was
that ethics cannot be taught." Thurman, Summary and Evaluation Report, in EDUCA-
TION IN THE PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LAWYER 41, at 50 (D. Weckstein
ed. 1970). The other Reporter indicated that "[in] any felt that a goal of guiding a
student toward higher personal ethical standards was not realistic." Sutton, Summary
and Evaluation Report, in id. 54, at 58.
See generally Carlin, What Law Schools Can Do About Professional Responsibility,
4 CONN. L. REV. 459 (1971-72), wherein it is suggested that the teaching of profes-
sional responsibility has been "largely a fruitless enterprise because it assumes that
professional norms and values can be 'internalized' during law school .... " Id. at 459.
6. For an interesting survey indicating that students can be trained to subordinate
their personal value preferences where clear precedents so dictate, see T. BECKER, Po-
LITICAL BEHAVIORALISM AND MODERN JURISPRUDENCE chs. IV & V (1964). Professor
Becker concluded that law students, acting as judges, were "virtually unanimous in
their dependence upon and reference to precedent as the foundation for their decision"
in deciding contrary to their own value preferences. Id. at 128. On the other hand,
only half the undergraduates "even alluded to precedent as the basis of their decision
against their own values." Id. at 129.
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Code of Professional Responsibility7 DR 9-102 proscribing such
commingling could result in severe sanctions. 8 Likewise, there may
not be anything personally unethical in an attorney's asserting "his
personal opinion as to the justness of a cause." It is only the effect
of such an assertion on the fair administration of the legal system that
makes such conduct professionally unacceptable and therefore "un-
ethical."9 Issues such as these can be effectively treated in a law
school setting.
Aside from acquainting students with those relatively unambiguous
rules of professional responsibility such as the above examples, a
formal course is essential to sensitize students to ethical questions as
yet unresolved by the Bar;10 as to these, even personal ethics of the
highest order may give little guidance. Only through extended discus-
sion and analysis will students be able to recognize these problems,
seek assistance when confronted by them in practice, and aid the legal
profession in its continuing efforts at resolution.
A second argument advanced against instruction in legal ethics is
that most law professors are not competent to teach professional re-
sponsibility because they have never engaged in the intense and active
practice of law in which most of the difficult ethical questions are
faced."' However, it remains to be demonstr"tecl hbat one must ac-
tually experience a particular ethical dilemma in order to recognize it
7. Adopted in 1969 [hereinafter cited as ABA CODE]. (All page citations are to
the 1969 edition, printed by Martindale-Hubbell, Inc.).
8. See, e.g., Resner v. State Bar, 53 Cal. 2d 605, 349 P.2d 67, 2 Cal. Rptr. 461(1960) (attorney disbarred for continuous course of commingling clients' funds and
use thereof for attorney's own purposes); Peck v. State Bar, 217 Cal. 47, 17 P.2d 112
(1932) (suspension for one year-no improper use or motive shown).
9. ABA CODE, DR 7-106(C)(4). Justifications offered for this rule include:
1) such assertions induce the trier of fact to determine guilt or innocence on the
basis of whether or not the attorney is believable or even likeable; 2) collateral mat-
ters thus dominate the trial; and 3) such an assertion in one case will require the
attorney either to lie when he does not believe his client or else to greatly prejudice
those clients whom he does not believe.
10. Despite the fact that ethical problems often must be left unresolved, the student
may be aided by being forewarned of the frequency with which lawyers are faced
with responsibility problems in their routine activities, by being alerted to the
kinds of situations out of which such problems often arise, and by being informed
of the various factors which should receive consideration by the lawyer as he
decides what course of conduct to pursue to resolve his particular problem.
T. SMEDLEY, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY PROBLEMS RELATING TO MORTGAGE TRANS-
ACTIONS 1(1966).
11. Remarks of Prof. Charles Meyers, then President-Elect of the Association of
American Law Schools, delivered at a meeting of the Board of Visitors of the Stan-
ford Law School, Apr. 4, 1974, and at the Conference of Western Law Schools, Apr.
6, 1974.
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and attempt a resolution in a classroom setting. One does not have to
have been a prosecutor to enunciate the advantages, disadvantages,
and underlying rationale of prosecutorial discretion and plea bar-
gaining. Nor must one have served as a public defender to help stu-
dents identify and analyze ethical problems encountered in the defense
of one known to be guilty. Even if it were true, this argument indi-
cates the need for greater efforts to better educate professors, not the
abandonment of efforts to educate students with respect to their eth-
ical duties.
Professor Currie has written that "training for professional respon-
sibility and for awareness of the role of law in society is not a matter
that can be parcelled out and assigned to certain members of the fac-
ulty at certain hours, but is the job of all law teachers all of the
time.' 12 A misreading of this statement has led some to the belief that
professional responsibility should only be taught as individual ethical
problems arise in each law school course; a formal course would be
either elective or nonexistent. True, it would be most effective for all
professors to indicate and discuss ethical issues as they arise in each
course,'3 but there are too many ethical problems, particularly those
dealing with the proper functioning of the legal system as a whole,
which would be cursorily treated or totally ignored in the absence of a
separate course in professional responsibility.' 4
Most important is the institutional commitment to the importance
of legal ethics. Establishment of a core curriculum common to all law
training expresses the belief that lawyers should be familiar with cer-
tain basic concepts and principles. Some required courses (e.g., Con-
tracts and Property) form the foundation for more complex analysis.
Others, like Constitutional Law (which has increasingly been adopted
12. Currie, Law and the Future: Legal Education, 51 Nw. U.L. REv. 258, 271
(1956).
13. As one means of putting this procedure into effect, Vanderbilt Law School
has prepared a set of teaching materials for use in raising ethical issues as they arise
in the various substantive courses. "These materials are designed to suggest ethical
and responsibility issues which are particularly relevant to the subject of the course, to
indicate at what points in the class discussion such matters may be introduced most
naturally, and to propose methods by which the questions may be raised most effec-
tively." T. SMEDLEY, supra note 10, at 1.
14. Also, a number of professors have expressed to the author that the time pres-
sures and need for coverage in their particular subjects make it difficult, if not impos-
sible, to integrate ethical considerations into their courses. Hence, absent a course in
Professional Responsibility, some students might, never be forced to consider the ethi-
cal problems they must face as lawyers.
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as a required, often first-year, course), are necessary for a better un-
derstanding of all areas of the law. Still others, such as Criminal Law,
are considered to be so important to society that every lawyer should
have the basic skills necessary to monitor and assist the profession's
efforts in that area. By any of these criteria, professional responsibility
is a course which should be required for all those who enter into the
practice of law.
A. The Traditional Approaches
One reason for the present resistance to courses in professional re-
sponsibility is the fact that the nature of the more enigmatic ethical
problems defies the traditional law school modes of presentation: lec-
ture and the Socratic method. These techniques are particularly inap-
propriate where professional ethical duty is the subject matter and
compliance with that duty is the goal. A mode of instruction which
involves only a few students (Socratic method) or none at all (lecture)
cannot successfully induce students to recognize the vast array of po-
tentially unethical courses of action, let alone to subordinate their per-
sonal views to the good of the legal system. As one educator has
stated:1 5
A teacher can lecture about ethics and the students can discuss without
personal involvement what the proper course of behavior should be
for everyone. But this very ease of universal moral judgment lessens
the effectiveness of classroom instruction in ethics and professional
responsibility. It is too easy an exercise to make a dent on the psyche.
And, since not much of lasting impact is taken away by the student,
these classroom courses do not rate high in the law school curriculum.
The need to involve both student and professor in the situations where
ethical problems are faced has led to the effort to teach professional
responsibility in the context of law clinics: 1 6
Only in the clinic, where the teacher and the student are personally
involved; where they have to take action and face the consequences;
where they undergo tensions which upset their emotions and take
away their peace of mind, is there opportunity to develop the moral
15. Pincus, Law School Clinical Training for Professional Responsibility and Com-
petence, 6 ALI-ABA CLE REV., July 18, 1975, at 2.
16. Id.
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fiber and the proper instincts for dealing with ethical problems in a
professionally responsible way.
Despite the advantages of teaching professional responsibility in a
clinical legal education context, however,' 7 three major defects render
this technique unacceptable as the sole or even primary law school
effort in the area. First, and most obvious, in those schools which pro-
vide clinical programs not every student enrolls in the program. Sec-
ond, due to lack of funds, shortage of faculty members, and other re-
lated reasons, most clinical programs assign students to a practicing
attorney, usually in a legal aid office of some kind. The "supervising"
attorney generally has little time for careful review and analysis of the
student's legal competence, let alone ethical awareness. The attorney
himself may even set a bad example by unwittingly engaging in
unethical practices. 18 It is not possible for the practicing lawyer to do
an effective job of teaching professional responsibility in the midst of
the overwhelming demands involved in supervising unskilled students
who are handling the diverse legal problems of numerous clients. The
situation is improved if a faculty member is in charge of the clinical
program and reviews the work of each student, but even then the
press of the workload, the sheer number of students involved, and the
unexpected appearance of ethical dilemmas requiring snap decisions
make unethical actions probable. Hence the third objection to the
17. Both the advantages and disadvantages of teaching professional responsibility
in conjunction with a clinical program are evident from a reading of LAWYERS, CLIENTS
& ETHICS (M. Bloom ed. 1974). Sponsored by The Council on Legal Education for
Professional Responsibility, Inc., the book presents 15 "case histories" of ethical prob-
lems faced in the context of a clinical program in the San Francisco Bay area. The
cases are followed by the commentaries of a prominent practitioner, two law profes-
sors who teach professional responsibility, and a psychiatrist who is also a law profes-
sor.
The book is an excellent vehicle for recognizing and analyzing common pitfalls en-
countered by students in their initial contacts with real clients and the resulting ethical
and practical dilemmas. The ability of the supervising attorney to discourage unethical
behavior and instruct students with respect to the problems with various alternative
courses of action is clearly evident in many instances. Yet in every case discussed, a
client was subjected to some form of unethical (sometimes even illegal) conduct. The
supervising attorney was often unable to prevent such actions beforehand and missed
valuable opportunities to sanction or criticize the actions after the fact; few of the stu-
dents were made to understand why they had acted in a particular way and what could
be done to prevent a re-occurence.
18. E.g., in one case history utilized in LAWYERS, CLIENTS & ETHICS, supra note 17,
a supervising attorney, despite his better judgment, permitted one of his students to
oppose a rehearing beneficial to her client, in order to appeal so that the eventual de-
cision would be published and contribute to the student's prestige. Id. at 107, 109
(comments of Fellers), 110 (comments of Sacks).
279
Washington Law Review
clinical method of teaching professional responsibility is that it is
unfair to prospective clients to subject them to students as yet un-
trained in their ethical duties-even if the students' mistakes are sub-
sequently corrected. 19
B. An Alternative Method
There is an alternative, however, one which retains the benefits of
teaching professional responsibility in conjunction with a clinical pro-
gram, yet at the same time eliminates many of the disadvantages.
The method, developed by Professor Barbara Babcock and the au-
thor, was taught for the first time at Stanford Law School in 1974. It
simulated lawyers' resolution of some of the thornier ethical questions,
utilizing hypotheticals which, for the most part, were derived from
actual cases and experiences. Each week the class members were
asked to assume a role such as members of a state bar grievance
committee, OEO-funded legal aid office, high-powered metropolitan
law firm, or disciplinary board to review judicial conduct. The prob-
lems presented various potential courses of action: whether to repre-
sent a particular client, employ a given defense, reveal allegedly
unethical conduct of another attorney, or sanction an attorney or
judge for certain actions. A member of the class was assigned to write
a memorandum concerning the choice of future action on each side of
the issue, and the memoranda were distributed prior to class. Each
side then argued its position in class. After the class members had con-
sidered and evaluated all of the available alternatives from both an
"ethical" and "practical" perspective, a series of public votes were
taken on the available options.
There are several advantages to this kind of simulation over a
strictly clinical approach. The issues and problems can be tailored to
present certain specifically desired aspects of legal ethics. A limited
amount of time can be put to its best use by raising ethical dilemmas
which a lawyer or clinical student might not face in many years of
practice. Ethical problems faced in all areas of the law, by extremely
diverse groups of lawyers (government, small firm, large metropolitan
19. As Professor Rogow has put it: "Sorry, your husband died while we were ex-
perimenting on him in the operating room, but, you know, we have to learn somehow.
Yes, but when do they teach the course on human responsibility? Should it not be
prior to trial tactics and open-court surgery?" Id. at 93.
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firm, legal aid, defense-oriented, civil, criminal), can be presented to
the students. Since subject matter control is attainable, particularly
difficult or appealing clients and situations may be created.
Another advantage is that the instructor, aided by the class, can
isolate and analyze the issues in light of the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility, state codes, general principles of ethics, and pragmatic
considerations. Additionally, the course can be offered prior to any
student attempts at actual law practice. Ethical "mistakes" occur, are
detected, and discipline "imposed" at no cost to the students and,
more importantly, at no cost to the public. No unethical conduct es-
capes consideration because of time, expense, or personality prob-
lems. Finally, the job of the clinical supervisor will be made substan-
tially easier where the students have viewed common ethical dilemmas
from a variety of perspectives. 20 This is not to say that law schools
20. A brief summary of one of the problems and the students' responses thereto
may best illustrate advantages of this approach to the teaching of Professional Respon-
sibility. The problem was:
A few days ago John Johnson, president of our community public housing proj-
ect's Tenants Association, visited the legal services office with a Ms. Joan Welling-
ton, a tenant of the housing project and a new member of the Association. John-
son and Ms. Wellington claim that the Wellingtons have just received an eviction
notice from the City Housing Authority, and that the only (unofficial) reason for
this notice was that Ms. Wellington's sixteen-year-old son had recently been ar-
rested and charged with disorderly conduct, though the charges were subsequently
dropped. Johnson wants the office to prevent the Wellington's eviction, and thereby
"straighten up" the Housing Authority's eviction policy. Johnson claims to speak
for an "overwhelming majority" of the members of the Tenants Association.
The day following the aforementioned visit, five tenants of the housing project
(three of whom are known to be members of the Tenants Association) visited the
legal services office and insisted that Johnson's request did not comport with the
desires of the project's "decent" tenants. They claim to endorse the Housing
Authority's policy of evicting "unruly" tenant-families, and appear to oppose the
office's representation of Ms. Wellington.
Later that same day, Johnson reappeared at the legal services office and restated
his request that we represent Ms. Wellington. He also requested that the office
draft a set of by-laws for the Tenants Association which would prevent its "take-
over" by a faction holding the same views as our five tenant-visitors.
One student wrote a memorandum in favor of representing Ms. Wellington; another
wrote in favor of representing the Tenants Association rather than Ms. Wellington. At
the meeting of the class/legal aid office, the following practical and ethical issues
were among those raised and analyzed:
(I) Conflict of interest: Is the Tenants Association a "client" of the legal aid
office? Do the five individuals who objected to our representation of Ms. Wel-
lington speak for the majority of the tenants in the Association? Is the Asso-
ciation properly constituted and representative? Does the office have the right
to make that decision? Can the office ethically represent both the Tenants
Association and Ms. Wellington?
(2) The need for a legal aid office to build a good community reputation and win
the confidence and support of individuals and organizations in the commu-
nity: Should this interest dictate taking any and all community cases? Only
281
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should abandon or even diminish their efforts to teach professional
responsibility in conjunction with clinical programs. Such instruction
is essential, but should not be the students' first and only exposure to
lawyers' ethical duties.
1. Shortcomings of the method
There are disadvantages to teaching professional responsibility in
the above-described manner. The course cannot exactly simulate the
pressures of practice-the time constraints, the financial burdens, the
adamant client, or lures of prestige in litigating "The Case" in a partic-
ular area of the law; these problems are, however, at least raised and
discussed. The more serious disadvantage in this method, however, is
the problem of expense and resource allocation. There were 22 stu-
dents in the Stanford course. At the University of Washington, the
course is now being taught to 30 students. In order to reach a greater
number of students, it might be necessary to involve more teachers,
modify the course, or experiment with a larger class enrollment. But it
is clear that law schools will not have met their responsibility to the
public until all students receive effective instruction in professional
responsibility prior to practicing law, whether in a clinical program
or upon graduation.
individuals? Only organizations? Should the interests of community leaders
be considered? Should they be decisive?
(3) In representing Ms. Wellington the office would be supporting law reform in
the area. But Ms. Wellington is (or may be) in a small minority, and action
on her behalf could alienate the majority of members in the community, de-
stroy the efficacy of the Tenants Association, and result in extreme distrust for
the legal aid office. In a poor community where solidarity is essential, shouldn't
the office support any organized group which democratically represents the
community? Does the office have the right to sacrifice the legal rights of the
few for the good of the many? Should the office attempt to persuade the Ten-
ants Association to support Ms. Wellington for its own benefit?
(4) Could the office refer Ms. Wellington to another legal aid office or private at-
torney? Could she afford the latter? Or could the office convince someone to
take her case pro bono?
(5) Should the office refrain from representing either party, at least until they re-
solve their internal conflict? Should the office take an active part in trying to
persuade either of the two opposing parties to adopt the other's position?
And what about the suggested by-laws--should the office help?
(6) Do the office's congressional mandate and resource allocation permit or re-
quire only representation of individuals or organizations?
Most importantly, the need for further investigation of the facts, the organizational
setup of the Tenants Association, and the positions of the opposing factions were em-
phasized.
This problem was derived from a problem used in Professor Howard Lesnick's Legal
Profession Course at the University of Pennsylvania Law School.
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2. The difficulty in practical application of the Code
In a course which concentrates solely on professional responsibility,
with no immediate duty to real life clients, students are able to go
beyond the specific problem at issue and recognize defects in the
system itself. For example, in the Stanford experiment, the breakdown
of votes by members of the class indicated serious defects in the Code
of Professional Responsibility as a means of defining and enforcing
legal ethics. In each case of alleged misconduct, the class voted on
whether specifically charged Ethical Considerations had been trans-
gressed, whether Disciplinary Rules had been violated, and what sanc-
tions, if any, should be imposed.
As an experimental simulation of lawyers' handling of ethical ques-
tions in the context of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
class could be considered a success. Observation of the class' treat-
ment of the problems yielded useful insight into possible reasons for
the reluctance of bar grievance committees to sanction attorneys for
Code violations. Of primary importance to the self-government of
lawyers was the class' treatment of the Code as if it were a criminal
statute, reflected in its importation of procedures and concepts from
the criminal law.2 1 If an attorney were to be "punished," he or she
must have been found to have violated "the law." For example, the
class had, in many instances, a relatively clear idea of what conduct
was most desirable. This was reflected in the high percentage of the
class indicating that one or more of the aspirational Ethical Consider-
ations had been transgressed.22 But severe problems arose when the
class attempted to analyze alleged breaches of the mandatory Discipli-
nary Rules under commonly accepted principles of "due process. '23
21. The Supreme Court similarly requires that the Code be applied consistent
with due process. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968). See also Goodrich v. Supreme
Court of South Dakota, 511 F.2d 316, 318 n.4 (8th Cir. 1975).
22. Neither the Code nor any body chosen to enforce it, however, has determined
the effect of a failure to observe an Ethical Consideration. "The Ethical Considera-
tions are aspirational in character and represent the objectives toward which every
member of the profession should strive." Preliminary Statement to ABA CODE at 1.
Since no indication had been given to the offender that any sanction would be imposed
for such a failure, the class determined that lack of notice precluded imposition of
sanctions for violations of Ethical Considerations, regardless of the severity of the
transgression. Violations of Ethical Considerations were taken into account, however,
with respect to the severity of the sanction ultimately imposed for violation of one or
more Disciplinary Rules.
23. The dificulty which the class experienced in this regard may be traced to the
fact that "[t] he Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Ethical Considerations, are mandatory
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Substantively, sections of the Code were found to be "void for
vagueness." For example, attorneys violate DR 1-102(A)(6) if they
"[e] ngage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on [their] fit-
ness to practice law." As a section of a criminal code, it would be
stricken because "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning"24 and the class often felt compelled to take just such a
course of action. If the Disciplinary Rule at issue in a particular
problem was not sufficiently clear, if it did not proscribe narrowly
defined conduct, then it could not be made the basis for sanctions.
Likewise, if the "attorney" for the alleged offender could find in the
Code a Disciplinary Rule that might be reasonably interpreted to jus-
tify or mandate the conduct in question, the class reluctantly refused
to find any violation, or if a violation was found, only a warning or no
sanction at all was imposed.25 The class perceived the injustice of
imposing any but very minor sanctions under such circumstances, a
perception also evident outside the classroom from the infrequency of
severe penalties imposed by bar grievance committees.
Since neither the Code, the class, nor the Bar in general have as yet
identified, much less proposed, a single or even primary guiding prin-
ciple for determining the nature and effect of alleged misconduct, ra-
tionalizations are readily available to an alleged offender. For exam-
ple, a portion of one of the class problems dealt with what would seem
to be a clear-cut violation of the Code. In a negligence action brought
on behalf of a mental incompetent who was injured on Attorney X's
client's property "while properly there," the court, on its own motion,
ruled that since the plaintiff was incompetent, he could not testify.
Attorney X moved for a directed verdict against the plaintiff. He was
aware of but did not reveal to the court a case decided by the state
supreme court which was almost one hundred years old and seldom
in character. The Disciplinary Rules state the minimum level of conduct below which
no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action." Id. No other guidance
is provided, however, with respect to the nature of the "disciplinary action" to be im-
posed: "The severity of judgment against one found guilty of violating a Disciplinary
Rule should be determined by the character of the offense and the attendant circum-
stances." Id.
24. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). See Chicago
Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975) (ABA Code Disciplinary
Rules seeking to proscribe extrajudicial comments by attorneys during both civil and
criminal cases held to be unconstitutionally vague and overbroad).
25. "A statute ... is ambiguous when it is capable of being understood by reason-
ably well-informed persons in either of two or more senses." State ex rel. Neelen v.
Lucas, 24 Wis. 2d 262, 267, 128 N.W.2d 425, 428 (1964).
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cited, but never overruled. The case held that in circumstances similar
to those involved in the trial, an incompetent plaintiff may take the
stand in his own behalf, and the weight of his testimony will be left to
the jury.
Attorney X was charged with a violation of DR 7-106(B)(1):26
In presenting a matter to a tribunal, a lawyer shall disclose ...
[1] egal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to him to be di-
rectly adverse to the position of his client and which is not disclosed
by opposing counsel.
The student assigned to defend Attorney X emphasized the impor-
tance in an adversary system of loyalty to one's client. ("In the exer-
cise of his professional judgment on those decisions which are for his
determination in the handling of a legal matter, a lawyer should
always act in a manner consistent with the best interests of his
client.") 27
Although the best interests of the client (presumably nondisclosure
of the prior case in this hypothetical) may arguably be subordinated to
an unambiguous contrary Disciplinary Rule, it was contended that
DR 7-106(B)(1) is ambiguous as to whether it applies only to the sub-
stantive law of the case, or also to "procedural matters such as the
competency of a witness to testify. '28 The student argued that under
the adversary system, it must have been intended that only contrary
principles of substantive law need be revealed:29
Any other construction would require the lawyer, for example, to dis-
close authority adverse to his position when he objects to testimony on
the grounds that it is hearsay. The number of times during a trial that
the attorney would be required to undermine his client's claim is po-
tentially enormous. The adversary system could not tolerate such a
burden.
Since the Disciplinary Rule on its face did not provide clear guidance,
it was quite proper, contended X's "attorney," for X to assume that the
rule in question referred only to substantive law. In fact Ethical Con-
26. ABA CODE.
27. ABA CODE, EC 7-9.
28. Brief in Defense of Clint Whitehead at 6 (Student Memorandum, Stanford
Professional Responsibility Class), copy on file at the offices of the Washington Law
Review.
29. Id. at 7.
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sideration 7-3 provides that "[w] here the bounds of law are uncer-
tain, the action of a lawyer may depend on whether he is serving as
advocate or adviser.. . . While serving as advocate, a lawyer should
resolve in favor of his client doubts as to the bounds of the law."
Even though the class ultimately concluded that Attorney X had
acted improperly, her defense of good faith resolution of conflicting
Code sections in favor of her client was accepted by the class to the
extent that it voted not to discipline X, other than to issue a warning
that in the future such conduct would result in more severe sanctions.
This resolution of the Attorney X case is typical of class decisions
with respect to other problems and suggests one of the major obstacles
to imposition of effective sanctions by bar grievance committees. At a
time when the ethics of the legal profession are questioned with in-
creasing frequency, a mode of instruction which reveals deficiencies in
the present disciplinary system is invaluable. The legal community can
also benefit from this recognition and isolation of the Code's deficien-
cies.
II. ENFORCING PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Innovations in the teaching of professional responsibility alone
cannot ensure satisfactory ethical performance by lawyers until the
members of the legal profession collectively provide students and at-
torneys with an unambiguous and uncontradictory set of principles
concerning the lawyer's proper function in the legal system. The view
of professional responsibility as dependent upon the moral responsi-
bility of individual lawyers has resulted in a set of rules which give
attorneys little guidance as to what the profession expects of them. 30
30. Indeed, the theme of individual moral choice by attorneys is expressed through-
out the language of the Preamble to the Code of Professional Responsibility:
The continued existence of a free and democratic society depends upon recognition
of the concept that justice is based upon the rule of law grounded in respect for
the dignity of the individual and his capacity through reason for enlightened self-
government. Law so grounded makes justice possible, for only through such law
does the dignity of the individual attain respect and protection. Without it, individ-
ual rights become subject to unrestrained power, respect for law is destroyed, and
rational self-government is impossible.
The Code of Professional Responsibility points the way to the aspiring and pro-
vides standards by which to judge the transgressor. Each lawyer must find within
his own conscience the touchstone against which to test the extent to which his
actions should rise above minimum standards ....
ABA CODE at I (emphasis added).
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Attorneys are told that they have a duty to their clients, to the legal
profession, and to society as a whole.31 In a very few instances, these
duties do not conflict (e.g., a lawyer shall not engage in "illegal con-
duct involving moral turpitude"32). When they do conflict, however, a
search of the relevant state code usually reveals no more guidance
than to "do the right thing" under the circumstances. The attorney is
not told which of the conflicting duties is deemed to be of greater
importance or given an ultimate goal or legal theory to apply. These
problems of determining and enforcing professional responsibility
under the Code are not limited to students. Rather, they are an inevi-
table by-product of a situation-oriented approach to the analysis of
ethical dilemmas. The presently operating system is described herein
as the "situation model" of professional responsibility, and is con-
trasted with two alternative "system models." It is the thesis of this ar-
ticle that the situation model (exemplified by the ABA Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility) has failed to provide the necessary guidance,
and that it must be replaced with a system model to ensure profes-
sional responsibility.
A. The Situation Model
The essence of this model is that each situation in which an ethical
question is presented is unique. The situation may demand primacy
for the truth, or for maintenance of the adversary system, or for the
attorney's personal ethics, or for other goals relevant only to the par-
ticular problem. A uniform goal orientation is subordinated to reach-
ing the "right" result in each case.
For instance, under the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility,
the goal of preserving the lawyer-client privilege, with its concomi-
tants of encouraging trust and candor, is paramount in the situation
where the client admits committing the crime charged. There is an
absolute duty on the attorney not to reveal in any way what has been
learned-no matter what the client's admission indicates about the
future dangerousness of the client, nor how personally distressing it
may be to the lawyer to conceal the knowledge.33 But this interest in
31. Preamble and Preliminary Statement to ABA CODE at I. See generally id. Can-
ons 4, 5, 6, & 7 (duty to client); 1, 2, 8 (duty to legal profession); 3, 9 (duty to pub-
lic).
32. ABA CODE, DR 1-102(A)(3).
33. ABA CODE, DR 4-101(B). See EC 4-4, EC 4-5.
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protecting the relationship of the lawyer and client disappears when
the client reveals an intention to commit another crime. In this situa-
tion, the Code suggests that the lawyer consider first the protection of
the public and second his or her own integrity. 34 Knowledge of an
intent to commit a crime thus calls for radically different behavior on
the part of the lawyer, even though revelation of the client's confi-
dence will be equally destructive of the relationship in either case. The
situational model is, in effect, a balancing test, which has intuitive
appeal. 35 But its practical application raises perplexing questions
about the factors to be balanced and their relative weight.
Factors to be considered in any ethical decision under the tradi-
tional Code analysis include the public interest, the individual needs
of the client, and the role of the lawyer according to the nature of the
transaction. Perhaps the most difficult to weigh is the public interest.
An example is a recent cause celebre in New York: appointed attor-
neys representing an indigent learned that their client had not only
committed the murder of which he was accused, but two others as
well. 36 The two victims had been missing for many months, and the
fact of their murders was unknown. The client gave the lawyers suffi-
cient information to discover the bodies. At this point, a layperson
would surely think that the public interest would demand disclosure of
these crimes, and certainly any decent person would desire to disclose
them. But the lawyers, despite such a desire, felt bound by Canon 4,
which states that "A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and
Secrets of a Client,"37 and did not reveal what they knew. This rule
expresses the public interest in maintaining the almost sacred trust
between lawyer and client which enables the work of the law to prog-
ress because clients will candidly disclose their affairs. Yet one of the
footnotes to the rule of confidentiality states that "'[p] ublic policy
forbids that the relation of attorney and client should be used to con-
34. See ABA CODE, DR 4-101(C)(3).
35. See Carlin & Howard, Legal Representation and Class Justice, 12 U.C.L.A.L.
REV. 381, 386-407 (1965); Note, Legal Ethics and Professionalism, 79 YALE LJ.
1179, 1186, 1189 (1970).
36. People v. Beige, 83 Misc. 2d 186, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Onondaga County Ct.
1975).
37. ABA CODE. See id. DR 4-101. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West
1974) provides: "It is the duty of an attorney . . . [t]o maintain inviolate the confi-
dence, and at every peril to himself to preserve the secrets, of his client."
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ceal wrongdoing,' "38 and that "'a communication by a client to his
attorney in respect to. . .a continuing wrong is not privileged from
disclosure.' "9
Unfortunately, the mode of analysis by which these lawyers were to
define and weigh the public interest in their case was unclear. Techni-
cally, within the explicit dictates of the Code, there was no" future or
ongoing "wrongdoing" in the sense of criminal activity. But neither
were the murders a fait accompli, since the parents, and police were
continuing the search for the missing persons not yet known to be
dead. Much "wrongdoing" in the sense of added suffering and expense
was ongoing due to the silence of the lawyers involved. It would seem
that at the very least the attorneys should have informed the parents
or police anonymously, through as many intermediaries as was neces-
sary to protect their client, of the death or whereabouts of the victims.
But because the factor of "public interest" is merely the expression of
a conclusion, the Code left the lawyers without meaningful guidance
for their actions and, quite properly, no sanctions were subsequently
imposed on them. Nor would any have been imposed had they re-
vealed the whereabouts of the victims. A system purporting to affect
self-discipline which exerts little or no influence in difficult cases is
inadequate. Additionally, there is some indication in the Code that a
lawyer's ethical decision changes according to the nature of his cli-
ent.40 For example, the organized Bar has recognized that legal ser-
38. ABA CODE at 18 n.15 (footnote to DR 4-101(C)(2) quoting ABA COMM. ON
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 156 (1936)).
39. Id.
40. Compare the general rule of DR 2-104(A): "A lawyer who has given unso-
licited advice to a layman that he should obtain counsel or take legal action shall not
accept employment resulting from that advice .. ." with the exception found in sub-
section (2) of the same Disciplinary Rule:
A lawyer may accept employment that results from his participation in activities
designed to educate laymen to recognize legal problems, to make intelligent selec-
tion of counsel, or to utilize available legal services if such activities are con-
ducted or sponsored by any of the offices or organizations enumerated in DR
2-103(D)(1) through (5), to the extent and under the conditions prescribed
therein.
The use of varying ethical standards would appear to have limited utility if effective
education and enforcement in terms of legal ethics is to be achieved. Whereas it may
be possible to delineate different standards of conduct for attorneys representing
wealthy and indigent clients, there would be no effective means of line drawing. For
example, should a well-staffed and financed public defender's office have a lesser duty
to the prosecutor or court than a private attorney representing a client earning $6,000
per year? Should these variable standards apply to rich and poor civil parties? At
what point is one no longer "indigent," so that the greater duty arises? For a discus-
sion of the difficulties involved in representing the poor see Wexler, Practicing Law for
Poor People, 79 YALE LJ. 1049 (1970).
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vices cannot be effectively delivered to the poor without informing
and persuading them of their need for such services and has made
special rules modifying the prohibition against solicitation and adver-
tisement by lawyers.4 ' Popular writers and many within the profession
have advocated a difference in a lawyer's duty when he acts for pri-
vate interests against the public (government) than where such advo-
cacy is performed in litigation between private parties.42 Whether the
attorney is being paid; whether the primary purpose of the representa-
tion is the vindication of constitutional rights; whether the attorney is
acting as prosecutor or defense attorney; all exemplify considerations
which may arise in the context of a particular ethical dilemma. All
must be thrown in the balance before the "right" course of action is
determined under the situation model of ethics.
This dilemma is further illustrated in the civil area by a problem
employed in the professional responsibility class discussed earlier,
which Professor Babcock refers to as the case of "The Destroyed Data
Base." In pursuing a complex antitrust action against the industry
giant (RPM), a small, relatively successful computer company (CDM)
constructed a computerized tape file from over 27 million RPM docu-
ments to serve as a "data base." This data base, among other advan-
tages, revealed trends and comparisons not otherwise evident from the
raw material. The Justice Department was also pursuing a civil anti-
trust action against RPM in an effort to break it into competing units
before it could develop a revolutionary new line of "virtual memory"
computers. RPM was under court order not to destroy any document
involved in the CDM litigation. RPM's general counsel, a former as-
sistant attorney general, knew that without the data base the Justice
Department would be unable to maintain its action against RPM suc-
cessfully. Since CDM's major concern was with RPM's strength in the
peripheral "software" area, the attorney negotiated a settlement of the
CDM action that transferred RPM's software servicing division to
CDM, along with $60 million in damages, in return for destruction by
CDM of the data base and all copies of RPM documents (RPM re-
tained the originals).
The result was that CDM obtained a virtual monopoly of one as-
pect of the computer industry, and RPM was protected from Justice
41. See, e.g., 19 AM. B. NEWS, Mar., 1974, at 1-2.
42. See Note, supra note 35, at 1196; J. GOULDEN, THE SUPERLAWYERS 329-330
(1972); ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 148 (1935).
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Department interference and was able to market its new line of com-
puters. The issue was whether the lawyer for RPM behaved ethically.
The answer under the Code is less than clear. DR 1-102(A)(5) pro-
vides that a lawyer shall not "[e] ngage in conduct that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice." Certainly the destruction of the data
base was prejudicial to the administration of the antimonopoly laws.
Certainly also, the public interest was adversely affected by the lawyer's
employment of his skills to prevent the effective public prosecution of
RPM. But if the lawyer believed that his client held an unjust monop-
oly, anything he did in the client's interest would be prejudicial to the
administration of justice, so if that rule were strictly adhered to, he
could not represent RPM at all, much less zealously.
If, on the other hand, the lawyer were to advise RPM that he
could not represent it because of a belief that the public interest would
be best served if RPM gave up its monopoly or at least gave the public
a fair opportunity to attack it, the lawyer might be violating the canon
which states that a lawyer should assist the legal profession in making
counsel available. 43 After all, if lawyers were to refuse to represent
clients whose goals they did not approve, there might be some clients
who would be without representation altogether.
Does the fact that the lawyer would not have appreciated the full
significance of the data base without prior experience in the Justice
Department create a conflict of interest? DR 9-101(B) provides that
"[a] lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in which
he had substantial responsibility while he was a public employee."
Only by interpolation does that rule apply to this case because there
was no suit pending against RPM at the time that the attorney was in
the Justice Department. Yet Canon 9, upon which DR 9-10103) is
based, states that a lawyer should avoid even the appearance of im-
propriety. As in the New York case,44 the Code's guidance is ambig-
uous and conflicting.
Another factor to be considered.by the ethical lawyer is the role he
or she is playing in a particular situation.45 Thus, an attorney may
43. ABA CODE, Canon 2.
44. See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
45. Lawyers have, for instance, been criticized for advocating "as lawyers, legisla-
tive measures which as citizens they could not approve .... " Louis D. Brandeis,
quoted in J. GOULDEN, supra note 42, at 326. A famous example of a lawyer assum-
ing different positions about what was right, according to the role he was playing, is
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have entirely different ethical obligations according to whether he or
she is a counselor, legislator, mediator, arbitrator, or advocate. 46 Eth-
ical problems arise when an attorney is asked to perform (or in good
faith believes it to be his or her duty to perform) several roles at the
same time. In the trial of the Chicago Seven,47 the attorneys for the
defendants were torn between performing traditional roles as advo-
cates-attacking the constitutionality of the antiriot statute and the
conspiracy charge, the rulings by the judge, and the wiretapping by
the Government-in short "doing everything to win, including having
the defendants cut their hair, wear suits, act decorously at the defense
table and avoid any speech or action that might antagonize the jury, ' 48
and what they believed to be their role in the conduct of a "political
trial." In the end, the attorneys chose both courses of action-and
were found in contempt 49 for their roles in the political aspect of the
trial while their clients were convicted.5 0 If, however, each situation is
to be judged on its own unique circumstances and attorneys are per-
mitted to observe ethical norms which vary with their role, then it is at
least arguable that the Chicago Seven defense was for the most part
proper. If in fact the defendants' lifestyles were on trial, then their
decision to present their belief in the injustice of a criminal prosecu-
tion based on their political views to the public outside the courtroom
cited with approval in the Report of the Joint Conference on Professional Responsibil-
ity:
As a barrister [Thomas] Talfourd had successfully represented a father in a suit
over the custody of a child. Judgment for Talfourd's client was based on his
superior legal right, though the court recognized in the case at bar that the
mother had a stronger moral claim to custody than the father. Having thus en-
countered in the course of his practice an injustice in the law as then applied by
the courts, Talfourd later as a member of Parliament secured the enactment of
a statute that would make impossible a repetition of the result his own advo-
cacy had helped to bring about. Here the line is clearly drawn between the obli-
gation of the advocate and the obligation of the public servant.
44 A.B.A.J. 1159, 1162 (1958).
46. Prof. Murray Schwartz has suggested, for example, that in a contested judicial
matter the standard of a lawyer's conduct is that he "should do everything for his
client that is lawful and that the client would do for himself if he had the lawyer's
skill." but that in nonlitigated matters the appropriate standard is that he "need not
do for his client that which the lawyer thinks is unfair, unconscionable or overreach-
ing, even if lawful." Schwartz, Legal Ethics v. Common Notions of Morality, 2 LEARN-
INC AND THE LAW, Spring, 1975, at 46, 49, 52 (emphasis in original).
47. See United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972); In re Dellinger,
461 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972).
48. Playboy Interview: William Kunstler, PLAYBOY, Oct., 1970, at 78.
49. In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972).
50. United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972).
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was legitimate. The role of such clients' attorney would not be that of
a traditional advocate, but in the nature of a legislator or "political
agent." 5 ' The role played by the lawyer, like the "public interest," is
therefore of little assistance in defining the proper course of action.
Even if there were agreement on the factors which should enter into
resolution of each ethical dilemma, the question remains one of who is
to do the balancing. At the first instance, the attorney decides, without
significant professional or institutional support to aid in the decision.
But realistic review or sanction of a decision made by balancing fac-
tors of such varying kinds and weights is nearly impossible.52 The
organized Bar's inability to establish unambiguous and uncontradic-
tory guidelines renders review of all but the most obvious violations
of the rules fundamentally unfair.
B. The System Model
A system-oriented model of professional responsibility would define
the lawyer's role in terms of the legal system's overall goals. The law-
yer's primary function would be to serve those goals to the best of his
51. As William Kunstler described the role:
The obligation of a lawyer for a defendant in a political trial is merely to explain
to the client what the law is and what penalties he may suffer for certain politi-
cal actions he may take in the courtroom. Once that's explained and the
defendant decides on a political defense, the lawyer's responsibility is to
help him do just that. In sentencing me for contempt, Judge Hoffman point-
ed out that I had never publicly admonished the defendants nor in any way
called them to task for what they were doing in the courtroom. He was right.
I hadn't. But as I told him then, and I tell you now, I don't think it is
my responsibility in a political trial to do that.
Again, I must emphasize that in a political trial, where the intent is to punish
a defendant for his thoughts, my conception of a lawyer's obligation is that he
must join with his client in presenting a political defense; that he should, in
effect, be the political agent of his client in the courtroom.
Playboy Interview, supra note 48, at 76. See also ABA CODE, EC 7-8, EC 7-3, EC
8-2, EC 8-9; ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 280 (1949).
See generally H. ZINN, DISOBEDIENCE AND DEMOCRACY (1968).
52. The general approach to sanctioning ethical violations has been expressed in
official documents as follows. The Introduction to The Defense Function in ABA
STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COMPILATION 114
(1974), provides:
The complexity of the demands which law and life place upon the trial lawyer
requires that his role be approached sympathetically, and that any set of stan-
dards for the judging of his conduct be reasonable in the demands it makes upon
his capacities and his humanity.
See also Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.AJ.
1159, 1218 (1958), cited in ABA CODE at 1 n.4; EC 9-2.
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or her ability regardless of personal ethics. The duty as a member of
the legal profession to subordinate personal morality for the good of
the system is not an adoption of the maxim "the end justifies the
means." Rather, it calls for awareness of the fact that each ethical di-
lemma does not stand on its own as a discrete entity, unrelated to
other parts of the system, and recognition that choosing the "best" or
most ethical course of action in a given situation might have an ad-
verse, "unethical" effect somewhere else in the system.
Take, for example, the case of the lawyer who, through skilled rep-
resentation, obtains an acquittal for a person who has committed a
heinous crime. Since the Constitution entitles one accused of a crime
to counsel, it is axiomatically ethical under our criminal justice system
to act as his counsel, no matter how horrible his crime or how "guilty"
or unpopular he may be.53 The attorney who attempts to exonerate
one he knows to be guilty is no less ethical than the prosecutor who
seeks to effect his conviction. Both are equally necessary to the proper
functioning of the system. Admittedly, there are essential functions
which the defense attorney does not perform. But that is why the
system provides police, prosecutor, judge, and jury. Therefore, an at-
torney who uses his skills on behalf of a "guilty" client acts properly
with respect to the system. One who does less for such a client than he
would do for "innocent" or popular clients improperly permits per-
sonal ethical beliefs to take precedence over professional responsi-
bility. The goal of the system is achieved only because the attorney
performs in a manner which might otherwise be perceived as uneth-
ical if considered in isolation.
Because the system model defines professional responsibility in in-
dividual cases in terms of a goal or guiding principle, it is essential
that the Bar achieve consensus as to the overall goal of each subpart
of our system of justice. The two most widely accepted goals of the
system, each often dictating somewhat different behavior in different
situations, are truth-oriented and adversary-oriented, with a subclass
of the latter applying only to criminal justice: innocence-oriented. The
following sections illustrate how each of these system models would
operate, indicating the advantages and disadvantages of each. The
final determination as to the most preferable is left to future consider-
ation by the legal profession.54
53. This position is reflected in the Code. ABA CODE. EC 2-27. EC 2-29.
54. One needed reform is the redrafting of the Code of Professional Responsibility
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1. Truth-oriented model
Under this model the Anglo-American trial is seen as a process
"within which man's capacity for impartial judgment can attain its
fullest realization," 55 and the function of the advocate is "to assist the
trier of fact in making this impartial judgmeftt.' '56 On a practical
level, extensive discovery procedures for civil litigation and the easing
of barriers to pretrial discovery in criminal law aid in implementing
and its state equivalents to indicate more clearly what conduct is prohibited. See, e.g.,
Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
Rule 16 foil. § 6076 (West 1974):
A member of the State Bar shall not, in the absence of opposing counsel,
communicate with or argue to a judge or judicial officer except in open court
upon the merits of a contested matter pending before such judge or judicial offi-
cer; nor shall he, without furnishing opposing counsel with a copy thereof, ad-
dress a written communication to a judge or judicial officer concerning the merits
of a contested matter pending before such judge or judicial officer. The rule shall
not apply to ex parte matters.
In those situations not resolved by the clear import of a particular Rule, the paramount
objective of the system as a whole must be determinative of the proper cause of ac-
tion and the appropriate discipline imposed for misconduct. It would seem too ele-
mentary to merit discussion that a code of professional responsibility-any code the
violation of which could result in severe sanctions--can only be properly interpreted
in view of its overall purpose. Whether the Code of Professional Responsibility is
considered from the perspective of its draftsmen or the attorneys who must abide by
it, a guiding principle is not evident.
Much of this inherent ambiguity can be resolved if the Bar would state the para-
mount objective of the Code with as much particularity as possible. For example, the
case of Attorney X, text accompanying notes 26-29 supra, would have been resolved
easily, without altering DR 7-106(B)(1), had another Disciplinary Rule proclaimed:
As an officer of the court, it is the lawyer's primary duty to assist in the search
for truth to the fullest extent possible. Therefore, in those cases where the lawyer's
allegiance to truth and his client's best interests come into conflict, he shall
choose that course which will best promote the search for truth, unless that
course is proscribed by statutory or decisional law.
Attorney X would then have had little difficulty in determining that he must reveal
the contrary case law; he would also have little defense to the imposition of sanctions
for his failure to do so. Of course, the Rule could also be drafted to provide that the
lawyer's primary duty [when acting in the capacity of advocate] is to his client and
the promotion of justice through the adversary system. The "adversary system"
would then be substituted for the "search for truth" in the above formulation. For
examples of the redrafting of individual rules to reflect the paramount goal chosen,
see note 124 infra.
The need for the Bar to determine and articulate the paramount objective of the
Code is clear, and that means the adoption of a system-oriented model of pro-
fessional responsibility. Which objective should be the guiding principle (i.e., which of
the system-oriented models should be adopted) is not so clear.
55. See Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, supra note
52, at 1161.
56. Noonan, The Purposes of Advocacy and the Limits of Confidentiality, 64
MICH. L. REV. 1485, 1487 (1966). See also Bress, Standards of Conduct of the Pros-
ecution and Defense Function: An Attorney's Viewpoint, 5 Am. CRIM. L.Q. 23, 24-25




the truth-oriented model. Partisan advocacy is appropriate only in-
sofar as it aids in the correct adjudication of the facts; when it "mis-
leads, distorts and obfuscates," it is unacceptable. 57 For example, DR
7-106(B)(1) 58 obligates an attorney to disclose to the court manda-
tory precedent which he knows is directly contrary to his client's posi-
tion and which is not cited by the opposing attorney. This provision is
based on ABA Opinion 146, 59 which interpreted former Canon 22
requiring an attorney to deal with the court with "candor and fair-
ness." 60 With respect to the duty to disclose adverse legal authority,
then, an attorney is ethically required to subordinate the client's inter-
ests to the profession's interest in truth.61
In addition to its intuitive appeal, the truth-oriented model permits
the lawyer to subordinate the client's interest to a higher personal
moral value. A lawyer is not forced to choose between what he or she
personally believes to be moral and professional responsibility to the
client:62
He [the barrister] gives to his client the benefit of his learning, his tal-
ents, and his judgment, but he never forgets what he owes to himself
and to others. . . . He has a prior and perpetual retainer on behalf of
truth and justice. He is the professional representative but not the alter
ego of his client.
57. Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, supra note 52,
at 1162.
58. The rule is set out in the text at note 26 supra. For further discussion see
text accompanying notes 26-29 supra.
59. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHics, OPINIONS, No. 146 (1935).
60. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs No. 22.
61. But see text accompanying notes 26-29 supra; Tunstall, Ethics in Citation:
A Plea for Re-Interpretation of a Canon, 35 A.B.A.J. 5 (1949). Mr. Tunstall severely
criticized Opinion 146 for ignoring the adversary nature of our system of adjudication:
[The lawyer] is not called upon to volunteer detractions from the force of his
own authorities. His march to a conclusion need not be interrupted by self-sought
skirmishes, nor continued to the accompaniment of dubitandos. He is an advo-
cate, not an umpire. He is participating in an argument, not a speculative inquiry;
a trial, not a confessional.
Id. at 6.
62. Burger, Standards of Conduct for Prosecution and Defense Personnel: A
Judge's Viewpoint, 5 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 11, 15 (1966) (quoting an unidentified "great
British barrister, later a judge"). See also Drinker, Some Remarks on Mr. Curtis' "The
Ethics of Advocacy," 4 STAN. L. REV. 349 (1952):
Of course no one could say that an occasion might not possibly arise when
there was no alternative except the truth or a lie and when the consequences of
the truth were such that the lawyer might be tempted to lie. This, however, would
not make it right for him to do so.
Id. at 350.
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Thus, the New York missing bodies case and the hypothetical case of
the destroyed data base, so difficult to resolve under the situation
model, are resolved easily under the truth model. In the former, a
lawyer would clearly have a duty to reveal the fact of the murders,
whether anonymously or not. In the latter, the attorney for RPM
would take into account the ultimate interest of the system in correctly
deciding the facts about RPM's interests and would not negotiate for
the destruction of the data base.
As these examples indicate, if our system were devoted to eliciting
the truth above all other goals, professional responsibility would be
both easy to teach and to enforce. If an attorney's actions for any
reason hindered or distorted rather than aided and enlightened the
search for truth, he would be remiss in his professional conduct. Yet
in our system of adjudication, truth is often not the highest goal.
Monroe Freedman has demonstrated that many of the accepted rules
of our legal system often serve to hinder, rather than to further, the
discovery of truth:63
The lawyer is an officer of the court, participating in a search for
truth. Yet no lawyer would consider that he had acted unethically in
pleading the statute of frauds or the statute of limitations as a bar to a
just claim. Similarly, no lawyer would consider it unethical to prevent
the introduction of evidence such as a murder weapon seized in viola-
tion of the fourth amendment or a truthful but involuntary confession,
or to defend a guilty man on grounds of denial of a speedy trial. Such
are permissible because there are policy considerations that at times
justify frustrating the search for truth and the prosecution of a just
claim.
Justice, not truth, is the overriding goal of the American legal system,
and "jj] ustice is something larger and more intimate than truth.
Truth is only one of the ingredients of justice. Its whole is the satisfac-
tion of those concerned." 64
Even if it were possible to conduct legal proceedings in such a way
that the truth always emerged, neither the profession nor the public
would be satisfied unless the truth was obtained in a just manner. In
fact, we have demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice some measure of
63. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The
Three Hardest Questions, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 1469, 1482 (1966) (emphasis added).
64. Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REV. 3, 12 (1951).
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truth in order to assure the litigants and the public that justice has
been obtained as well as the truth discovered.65 In a criminal proceed-
ing, probably the best means of eliciting the truth would be skillful
interrogation of the accused. Yet the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination protects the accused from any questioning
by law enforcement officers. Although the requirement that police
obtain evidence of a crime independently of the accused has truth-
serving components, the primary purposes for the privilege are hu-
manitarian in nature and unavoidably interfere with the discovery of
the truth. 66 In sum, the existing legal system is designed to effectuate
goals which sometimes take precedence over the search for absolute
truth. But because this is not generally acknowledged or understood,
lawyers often act to preserve truth and their personal integrity at the
expense of the adversary system and their clients.
For example, although the Bar considers the representation of the
unpopular and those believed to be guilty to be "[o] ne of the highest
services the lawyer can render to society," and although ABA Ethical
Consideration 5-1 provides that the professional judgment of a
lawyer "should be exercised, within the bounds of the law, solely for
the benefit of his client and free of compromising influences and loyal-
ties," inadequate defenses sometimes result from attorneys' devotion
to truth and personal moral standards. In Johns v. Smyth,67 for exam-
ple, the defendant, a prison inmate, was convicted of the murder of
another inmate and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Defense
counsel submitted no instructions as to lesser offenses, although ac-
cording to the defendant's statement made on the day following the
65. As one commentator has stated:
Before we will permit the state to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
we require that certain processes which ensure regard for the dignity of the in-
dividual be followed, irrespective of their impact on the determination of
truth. . . . [11n a society that respects the dignity of the individual, truth-
seeking cannot be an absolute value, but may be subordinated to other ends,
although that subordination may sometimes result in the distortion of the truth.
Freedman, Judge Frankel's Search for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1060, 1065 (1975)
(footnote omitted).
66. For delineation of the purposes underlying the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion see 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2251 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961); Aronson,
Should the Privilege Against Self-incrimination Apply to Compelled Psychiatric
Examinations?, 26 STAN. L. REV. 55, 60-62 (1973), and authorities cited therein.
See generally L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT (1968).
67. 176 F. Supp. 949 (E.D. Va. 1959). But cf. United States ex rel. Wilkins v.
Banmiller, 205 F. Supp. 123, 128 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1962), aff'd, 325 F.2d 514 (3d Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 847 (1964).
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crime, the killing was a reaction to advances by the deceased sug-
gesting homosexual acts. Under the laws of Virginia it was possible in
these circumstances for the defendant to have been convicted of vol-
untary manslaughter, carrying a sentence of five years. Further, de-
fense counsel agreed with the prosecutor to submit the case to the jury
without argument. In explanation of his actions, he stated that he
could not conscientiously argue that Johns was guilty of only man-
slaughter, in light of Johns"' 'very vague' "explanation of the incident.68
The court, in granting the writ of habeas corpus on the basis of inef-
fective assistance of counsel, stated:69
[W] hen defense counsel, in a truly adverse proceeding, admits that
his conscience would not permit him to adopt certain custonary trial
procedures, this extends beyond the realm of judgment and strongly
suggests an invasion of constitutional rights ...
The failure to argue the case before the jury, while ordinarily
only a trial tactic not subject to review, manifestly enters the field of
incompetency when the reason assigned is the attorney's conscience.
The attorney's personal moral values (truth-oriented) clearly inter-
fered with the goal of preserving justice in this case (adversary-ori-
ented).
An overriding concern for truth and the defense counsel's own per-
sonal morality were also responsible for the result in People v. Hei-
rens,70 where counsel induced the defendant to plead guilty to three
murders and a number of assaults and refused to raise an insanity de-
fense despite a weak prosecution case and counsel's own" 'doubts as to
this defendant's niental capacity for crime.' "71 The defendant had been
subjected to every kind of coercion and interrogation-including il-
legal search of his living quarters, four days of continuous question-
ing, and the use of sodium pentothal and lie detector tests-resulting
68. 176 F. Supp. at 953. Defense counsel further stated: "'You can talk.about
legal duty to client all you wish, but I consider it dishonest for me to get up before
a jury and try to argue that the statement that came out from the Commonwealth
was true when Johns had told me that it wasn't."' Id.
69. Id. at 952-53.
70. 4 Ill. 2d 131,122 N.E.2d 231 (1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 947 (1955).
71. Id. at 140, 122 N.E.2d at 237. Defense counsel further stated: "'I have no
memory of any case, certainly not in my time at the bar, when counsel on both sides
were so perplexed as to the mental status of an individual and the causes which moti-
vated him to do certain acts.'" Id. at 140, 122 N.E.2d at 236.
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in what would have been inadmissible real evidence and an inadmis-
sible confession. Despite this treatment and psychiatric evidence sug-
gesting mental instability, defense counsel repeatedly urged a guilty
plea because he and the prosecuting attorney72
. . . were collectively agreed that any thought on the part of the State
to cause this man to forfeit his life would be unjust. It would be unfair.
By the same token we were collectively agreed that any course on our
part which would assist in having him returned to society would be
equally unfair.
In ackn6wledging defense counsel's " 'cooperative assistance'" to the
court, the prosecutor stated that without defense counsel's aid, " 'to this
day a great and sincere public doubt might remain as to the guilt of
William Heirens .... ,
Although the court refused to reverse Heirens' conviction on his
guilty plea because the representation was not "of such low caliber as
to be equivalent to no representation at all,"74 it is clear that counsel's
first loyalty was to his own conscience and moral beliefs, rather than
to his client's interest in obtaining the best treatment permitted under
the law. Johns and Heirens are two instances where an attorney's de-
votion to truth and his own integrity subverted our system of justice.75
They are also examples of the need for the legal profession to provide
better guidance with respect to the proper resolution of conflicts be-
tween loyalty to one's client and loyalty to the truth.
2. Adversary-oriented model
Rather than requiring the judge to perform the functions of both
72. Quoted in id. at 140, 122 N.E. 2d at 237.
73. Id. at 140, 122 N.E.2d at 236.
74. 122 N.E.2d at 238.
75. Professor Alschuler has observed with respect to the Heirens case:
William Heirens' culpability under traditional legal standards was doubtful, yet
both the defendant and society were deprived of an authoritative resolution of
this issue. Heirens is today an inmate of the Stateville Penitentiary, although no
one has determined on the basis of the evidence that a prison is where Heirens
belongs. Society devised the insanity defense precisely to avoid such distressing
spectacles.
Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 75 (1968).
300
Vol. 51: 273, 1976
Professional Responsibility
investigator and arbitrator,76 the adversary system requires that each
side investigate, introduce, and argue the evidence most favorable to
its own side of a legal dispute:77
The philosophy of adjudication that is expressed in "the adversary
system" is, speaking generally, a philosophy that insists on keeping
distinct the function of the advocate, on the one hand, from that of the
judge, or of the judge from that of jury, on the other. The decision of
the case is for the judge, or for the judge and jury. That decision must
be as objective and as free from bias as it possibly can.
This method of presentation avoids the natural tendency to "judge too
swiftly in terms of the familiar that which is not yet fully known. 78
No matter how great an effort one makes to remain neutral, past ex-
perience, subconscious biases, and preconceptions formed from pre-
liminary investigation inevitably lead to prejudgment.79 Once a
number of facts indicate guilt, for example, the virtually irresistible
tendency is to find additional evidence substantiating the initial judg-
ment. Contrary evidence or testimony is thereafter not as actively pur-
sued. The adversary system recognizes this psychological tendency,
but avoids its dysfunctional aspects by instructing each side of a dis-
pute to form a bias and pursue all facts, testimony, legal precedents,
and arguments in its favor, and attack all evidence and arguments for
the opposing side. Through partisan advocacy, both sides are fully
presented to a trier of fact.8 0
A second function served by the adversary process of adjudication
is not only to ensure that justice in fact has been done, but that it also
appears to have been done. To the extent that trials take the place of
self-help by wronged individuals; to the extent that rehabilitation of
criminal offenders requires that those convicted believe themselves to
76. This is the requirement in a number of inquisitorial systems, particularly in
French criminal procedure. See generally Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction
and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REv.
506 (1973); Ploscowe, The Development of Present-Day Criminal Procedures in
Europe and America, 48 HARv. L. REV. 433 (1935); Vouin, The Role of the Prosecu-
tor in French Criminal Trials, 18 AM. J. ComP. L. 483 (1970).
77. Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 30 (H. Berman ed.
1961).
78. Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, supra note 52, at
1160.
79. See Fuller, supra note 77, at 36.
80. See Freedman, The Professional Responsibility of the Prosecuting Attorney,
55 GEo. LI. 1030 (1967).
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have been tried fairly; and to the extent that the orderly functioning of
government and protection against resort to violence require faith in
the integrity of the legal system; it is essential that all sides in a contro-
versy be seen to have been adequately represented. This function is
aided, particularly with respect to the accused in a criminal trial, by
providing a partisan advocate on either side of the controversy.
A third function of the adversary process in criminal cases, particu-
larly related to its educative aspect of making justice apparent, is the
preservation of the presumption of innocence. Professor Goldstein
deems the presumption of innocence central to the accusatorial
system:81
An accusatorial system assumes a social equilibrium which is not
lightly to be disturbed, and assigns great social value to keeping the
state out of disputes, especially when stigma and sanction may follow.
As a result, the person who charges another with crime cannot rely on
his assertion alone to shift to the accused the obligation of proving his
innocence. The accuser must, in the first instance, present reasonably
persuasive evidence of guilt. It is in this sense that the presumption of
innocence is at the heart of the accustorial system. Until certain proce-
dures and proofs are satisfied, the accused is to be treated by the legal
system as if he is innocent and need lend no aid to those who would
convict him.
The best way to accomplish this goal is by providing the accused a
representative who does not act according to a personal opinion on
the facts, but rather assumes innocence and acts as an advocate to
promote that view. 82
In maintaining the adversary system and the presumption of inno-
cence in the criminal justice system, each of the participants in the
system functions properly only if he understands and is able to fulfill
his role. It is in part due to the nature of the adversary system-that the
attorney must remain firmly in role-that he may not express a personal
belief as to the guilt or innocence of the client.8 3 Personal views
81. Goldstein, Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes in American
Criminal Procedure, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1009, 1017 (1974) (emphasis in original). Pro-
fessor Goldstein notes: "Comparativists generally assume that inquisitorial systems
are primarily concerned with enforcing criminal laws and are only incidentally con-
cerned with the manner in which it is done." Id. at 1018.
82. For a more detailed analysis of the presumption of innocence aspects of the
adversary model see notes 125-36 and accompanying text infra.
83. See ABA CODE, DR 7-106(C)(4).
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should be irrelevant to proper performance of this role. Loyalty to the
client, within the bounds of the law, must be paid absolute deference
because the system can only function properly if a member of the
legal profession argues the defendant's cause as forcefully and con-
vincingly as possible.8 4
Thus, under the adversary-oriented model there is no doubt but
that the attorneys for Johns and Heirens acted improperly. In the New
York missing bodies case, the lawyer would ask himself how the goals
of the adversary system would best be furthered. Since the system can
operate only if the relationship of trust and candor between lawyer
and client is given priority, the lawyer would be bound to withhold the
information about the missing bodies. 85 In the Destroyed Data Base
problem also, the lawyer for RPM may not forsake the interests of his
client. He must leave to the partisan advocacy and ability of the Jus-
tice Department the protection of the public interest in limiting com-
puter industry monopolies. He would negotiate for the destruction of
the data base.
a. Equal adversaries alternative
Proper functioning of the adversary-oriented model requires that
the advocates have equal weapons and "play according to the rules. '86
Formulating ethical rules for the advocates is a relatively straight-
84. Lord Brougham, in his defense of Queen Caroline's divorce case before the
House of Lords stated:
I once before took occasion to remind your Lordships, which was unnecessary,
but there are many whom it may be needful to remind, that an advocate, by the
sacred duty which he owes his client, knows in the discharge of that office but one
person in the world-that client and none other .... Nay, separating even the
duties of a patriot from those of an advocate, and casting them if need be to the
wind, he must go on reckless of the consequences, if his fate it should unhappily
be to involve his country in confusion for his client's protection.
Quoted in MACMILLAN, LAW & OTHER THINGS 195 (1937), and Curtis, supra note 64,
at 4.
85. The only accommodation the lawyer might make within this model is to seek
the client's consent to an anonymous revelation not linked to the client. In other
words, it might be possible to reveal the information about the fact of the murders
without revealing the implication from the client's own words that he was responsible
for them. Revealing the second piece of information would be unacceptable in the
adversary-oriented model.
86. References in this article and others in the field to "playing the game" or
"playing according to the rules" originated from the "sporting theory of justice," a
phrase used by Roscoe Pound in a famous 1906 address. Pound, The Causes of Pop-




forward task. Canon 22 of the former ABA Canons of Professional
Ethics laid the groundwork:87
It is not candid or fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote the
contents of a paper, the testimony of a witness, the language or the
argument of opposing counsel, or the language of a decision or a text-
book; or with knowledge of its invalidity, to cite as authority a deci-
sion that has been overruled, or a statute that has been repealed; or in
argument to assert as a fact that which has not been proved, or in
those jurisdictions where a side has the opening and closing arguments
to mislead his opponent by concealing or withholding positions in his
opening argument upon which his side then intends to rely.
A more difficult task is one of assuring that the adversaries are, as
nearly as possible, of equal ability in presenting their respective sides.
The innate and developed capacities of attorneys can only be kept
above a specified minimum level through Bar examination, continuing
education programs, and effective assistance of counsel doctrines. The
equality of their relative resources and bargaining positions, however,
might be increased through statutory reform, case law, or possibly by
varying ethical rules for the conduct of attorneys according to the
nature of the client.88
As Johns v. Smyth8 9 indicated, some control can be exercised if
counsel refuses to do enough for his or her client. Under similar anal-
87. Some of the many other "rules of the game" include: A lawyer should not
employ trial tactics that "would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another,"
ABA CODE, DR 7-102(A)(1), or "[k]nowingly make a false statement of law or
fact," ABA CODE, DR 7-102(A)(5); in appearing in his professional capacity before
a tribunal, a lawyer shall not "[a] sk any question that he has no reasonable basis to
believe is relevant to the case and that is intended to degrade a witness or other per-
son," ABA CODE, DR 7-106(C)(2), or "[flail to comply with known local customs
of courtesy or practice of the bar or a particular tribunal without giving to opposing
counsel timely notice of his intent not to comply." ABA CODE. DR 7-106(C)(5).
Substantial compliance with informal customs and practice is often achieved despite
the absence of formal sanctions. For example, although FED. R. Civ. P. 30 and 35
provide elaborate mechanisms for the taking of depositions and arranging for physical
or mental examination of the opposing party, in most jurisdictions the formal proce-
dures are unnecessary. One simply calls opposing counsel, establishes a mutually con-
venient time and place, and relies on good faith compliance. Absent unusual circum-
stances, an attorney who resorts (or compels opposing counsel to resort) to the ex-
pensive and time consuming formal procedures is ostracized by other members of the
Bar.
88. See note 40 supra.
89. 176 F. Supp. 949 (E.D. Va. 1959). But cf. United States ex rel. Wilkins v.
Banmiller, 205 F. Supp. 123, 128 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1962), affd, 325 F.2d 514 (3d Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 847 (1964). See notes 67-69 and accompanying text
supra.
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ysis, an attorney can also be rebuked for doing too much. In Com-
monwealth v. Scoleri,90 two prominent and respected members of the
Pennsylvania Bar were criticized for obtaining or attempting to obtain
a commitment from the sentencing judge in a criminal trial to impose
life imprisonment rather than the death penalty if their client were to
plead guilty. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated:9'
Mr. von Moschzisker and Mr. McBride each testified under oath that
in the absence of the district attorney he went to see one (McBride) or
several (von Moschzisker) Judges, with the intention of obtaining from
such Judge or Judges-whom they desired and solicited to sit in the
Scoleri case-an absolute commitment (McBride) or the equivalent of
a commitment (von Moschzisker) for a penalty of life imprisonment if
Scoleri would plead guilty. This conduct was indefensible and outra-
geous and cannot be too strongly condemned.
Counsel is to do neither more nor less for his client than the rules
allow. Otherwise, he would obtain a more or less than equal position
for his client in relation to opposing counsel.
Recent changes in the standard for review of challenges to effective
assistance of counsel illustrate the use of case law to effect greater
equality between adversaries. The traditional standard for effective-
ness is the "farce or mockery" test, under which representation will be
found ineffective only if it makes such a sham of the trial that it
shocks the conscience of the court.92 As Chief Judge Bazelon suc-
cinctly stated, however: "The 'mockery' test requires such a minimal
level of performance from counsel that it is itself a mockery of the
sixth amendment. ' 93 Recognizing this situation, several federal cir-
cuits have recently enunciated stronger tests for determining the effec-
tiveness of counsel. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
stated:94
The farce-mockery test is but one criterion for determining if an ac-
cused has received the constitutionally required minimum representa-
90. 415Pa.218,202A.2d521 (1964).
91. Id. at 229, 202 A.2d at 526 (emphasis in original).
92. United States v. Sanchez, 483 F.2d 1052, 1057 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 991 (1974); Hayes v. Russell, 405 F.2d 859, 860 (6th Cir. 1969); Davis v.
Bomar, 344 F.2d 84, 89 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383. U.S. 883 (1965).
93. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 28
(1973).
94. Herring v. Estelle, 491 F.2d 125, 128 (5th Cir. 1974).
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tion . . . . One may receive ineffective assistance of counsel even
though the proceedings have not been a farce or mockery. . . . Our
standard is reasonably effective assistance.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has emphasized that the
farce-mockery test should not be taken literally, but rather should
reinforce the notion that the petitioner must assume a heavy burden in
proving unfairness.95 In addition to farce-mockery language, that
court has evaluated effective assistance with reference to "a lawyer's
deliberate abdication of his ethical duty to his client," 96 and to the
"degree of competence prevailing among those licensed to practice
before the bar. '97
In each of the above cases the element added to the farce-mockery
test was some standard of reasonableness or professionalism. Several
circuit courts of appeal base their test for effectiveness of assistance
solely upon notions of reasonableness or professionalism. According
to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit:98
[T] he assistance of counsel required under the Sixth Amendment is
counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective
assistance. . . . Defense counsel must perform at least as well as a
lawyer with ordinary training and skill in the criminal law ....
Similar language has been used by the Courts of Appeals for both the
Ninth99 and District of Columbia circuits.' 00 A particular level of pro-
fessional competence is the test of effective assistance in other courts.
For example, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:
" [T] he standard of adequacy of legal services as in other professions
is the exercise of the customary skill and knowledge which normally
prevails at the time and place."' 01 The Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit recently rejected the farce-mockery test when it held that
"the Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant legal assistance
95. McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 214 (8th Cir. 1974).
96. Brown v. Swenson, 487 F.2d 1236, 1240 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
944 (1974).
97. Johnson v. United States, 506 F.2d 640, 646 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 978 (1975).
98. Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974).
99. United States v. Miramon, 470 F.2d 1362, 1363 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 934 (1973) (reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective
assistance). But see United States v. Martin, 489 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. de-
nied, 417 U.S. 948 (1974) (farce or mockery standard).
100. United States v. Butler, 504 F.2d 220, 223 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (reasonably
competent assistance).
101. Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736 (3d Cir. 1970).
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which meets a minimum standard of professional representation."' 102
A different approach for evaluating effective assistance of counsel has
been developed by Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and District of
Columbia circuits. These courts have set forth specific positive duties
required of defense counsel.103 Furthermore, the District of Columbia
court has stated that the specific duties enumerated were meant only
"as a starting point for the court to develop, on a case by case basis,
clearer guidelines for courts and for lawyers as to the meaning of
effective assistance."' 104 Just how far the trend towards requiring a
higher level of legal competence will develop is unclear, but the effort
to ensure a greater degree of equality between the adversaries is un-
mistakable.
Another example of the development of case law to assure equal
adversaries is the effort to lay ground rules for fair and just plea bar-
gaining. Although few cases or legal commentators suggest that plea
bargaining is a valued part of the criminal justice system in its fairness
or promotion of truth, 0 5 it is accepted by most as a necessary evil.' 06
102. United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 641 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 96 S. Ct. 148 (1975).
103. United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973):
Specifically-(1) Counsel should confer with his client without delay and as often
as necessary to elicit matters of defense, or to ascertain that potential defenses are
unavailable. Counsel should discuss fully potential strategies and tactical choices
with his client. (2) Counsel should promptly advise his client of his rights and
take all actions necessary to preserve them. Many rights can only be protected by
prompt legal action. . . . (3) Counsel must conduct appropriate investigations,
both factual and legal, to determine what matters of defense can be developed....
The investigation should always include efforts to secure information in the pos-
session of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities. And, of course, the
duty to investigate also requires adequate legal research.
Id. at 1203-04. Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849
(1968):
Counsel for an indigent defendant should be appointed promptly. Counsel should
be afforded a reasonable opportunity to prepare to defend an accused. Counsel
must confer with his client without undue delay and as often as necessary, to ad-
vise him of his rights and to elicit matters of defense or to ascertain that potential
defenses are unavailable. Counsel must conduct appropriate investigations, both
factual and legal, to determine if matters of defense can be developed, and to al-
low himself enough time for reflection and preparation for trial.
Id. at 226.
104. United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1203 n.23 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
105. In fact, the plea bargaining system is probably the single most prevalent ob-
stacle to truth finding in the criminal justice system. Defendants are charged with and
plead guilty to lesser crimes or crimes unrelated to the crimes actually committed.
Conviction and crime commission statistics are proportionately distorted. There is
even the possibility that some defendants are induced to plead guilty when they have
in fact committed no crime at all. See, e.g., Jones v. United States-423 F.2d 252 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 839 (1970).
106. Presently, over 85% of all criminal charges brought in federal district courts
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Reform efforts have therefore been directed for the most part towards
putting the defendant and the prosecutor in equal bargaining positions
and ensuring that the game is played fairly.' 0 7 In Anderson v. North
Carolina,0 8 for example, a plea bargain and subsequent guilty plea
were invalidated because the prosecutor talked with the defendant in
jail in the absence of his counsel. Commenting on the defendant's
unequal bargaining position the court noted: "Unquestionably peti-
tioner Anderson could not bargain on equal terms with the Solicitor.
The conference in the jail was inherently unfair, and the agreement
made there infects all subsequent proceedings."' 09 Recognition that if
the game of plea bargaining is to be played at all, it must be played
fairly, has also promoted an increasing effort through case law and
statutory reform to expose both bargaining and resulting agreements.
Rather than pretend that no deals have been made and that the de-
fendant fully admits guilt, what is required is that the defendant fully
understand his or her rights and that the agreement be fair."10
result in pleas of guilty or nolo contendere. Without such a high percentage, the over-
load on the courts could cause a complete breakdown in the system. See I C. WRIGHT,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 171, at 354-55 nn. 1&2 (1969).
107. Courts have recently gone so far as to treat plea bargaining agreements as
enforceable contracts where "fairness" requires, at the least, that the defendant be per-
mitted to plead again in the event the prosecution's promises are not fulfilled, and at
the most, that the defendant is entitled to his choice of remedies, including specific per-
formance. Compare Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257. 262 (1971) (If a guilty
plea "rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so
that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must
be fulfilled.") with Miller v. State, 272 Md. 305, 322 A.2d 527 (Ct. App. 1974) (When
a prosecutor reneges on his end of a plea bargain the defendant may elect to have his
guilty plea vacated and plead again or elect to leave the plea standing and be sen-
tenced before a different judge.).
108. 221 F. Supp. 930 (W.D.N.C. 1963).
109. Id. at 935. But cf. People v. Bowman, 40 I11. 2d 116, 239 N.E.2d 433, 438
(1968) (plea negotiations between sheriff and prisoner in absence of counsel did not,
without coercion, vitiate subsequent guilty plea).
110. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 423 F.2d 252, 255 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 839 (1970), where the court stated:
Full disclosure reduces the risk of an unfair agreement-unfair to the public
because of an unwarranted concession by an overburdened prosecutor anxious to
avoid trial; or unfair to the defendant because the concession is either illusory,
or, at the other extreme, so irresistible in light of the inevitable risks of trial as to
induce an innocent defendant to plead guilty.
See also Raines v. United States, 423 F.2d 526 (4th Cir. 1970).
Former FED. R. CRIM. P. II required the trial judge to insure that a guilty plea had
been voluntarily entered, but did not control the practice or even acknowledge the
existence of plea bargaining. As amended, however, Rule 11 both recognizes and es-
tablishes the ground rules for fair and open plea agreements:
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In addition to the attempt to provide effective representation and to
ensure equal adversary positions in plea bargaining in the criminal
area, greater attention is being directed to the problems of low income
litigants who often have no representation whatsoever. Public de-
fender systems and community legal services programs, together with
(e) Plea Agreement Procedure.
(1) In General. The attorney for the government and the attorney for the de-
fendant or the defendant when acting pro se may engage in discussions with a
view toward reaching an agreement that, upon the entering of a plea of guilty
or nolo contendere to a charged offense or to a lesser or related offense, the
attorney for the government will do any of the following:
(A) move for dismissal of other charges; or
(B) make a recommendation, or agree not to oppose the defendant's re-
quest, for a particular sentence, with the understanding that such recommen-
dation or request shall not be binding upon the court; or
(C) agree that a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of the
case.
The court shall not participate in any such discussions.
(2) Notice of Such Agreement. If a plea agreement has been reached by
the parties, the court shall, on the record, require the disclosure of the agree-
ment in open court or, on a showing of good cause, in camera, at the time the
plea is offered. Thereupon the court may accept or reject the agreement, or may
defer its decision as to the acceptance or rejection until there has been an op-
portunity to consider the presentence report.
(3) Acceptance of a Plea Agreement. If the court accepts the plea agree-
ment, the court shall inform the defendant that it will embody in the judgment
and sentence the disposition provided for in the plea agreement.
(4) Rejection of a Plea Agreement. If the court rejects the plea agreement,
the court shall, on the record, inform the parties of this fact, advise the defendant
personally in open court or, on a showing of good cause, in camera, that the
court is not bound by the plea agreement, afford the defendant the opportunity
to then withdraw his plea, and advise the defendant that if he persists in his
guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere the disposition of the case may be less
favorable to the defendant than that contemplated by the plea agreement.
(5) Time of Plea Agreement Procedure. Except for good cause shown,
notification to the court of the existence of a plea agreement shall be given at
the arraignment or at such other time, prior to trial, as may-be fixed by the
court.
(6) Inadmissibility of Pleas, Offers of Pleas, and Related Statements. Ex-
cept as otherwise provided in this paragraph, evidence of a plea of guilty, later
withdrawn, or a plea of nolo contendere, or of an offer to plead guilty or nolo
contendere to the crime charged or any other crime, or of statements made in
connection with, and relevant to, any of the foregoing pleas or offers, is not
admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding against the person who made the
plea or offer. However, evidence of a statement made in connection with, and
relevant to, a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, a plea of nolo contendere, or an
offer to plead guilty or nolo contendere to the crime charged or any other
crime, is admissible in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false statement if
the statement was made by the defendant under oath, on the record, and in
the presence of counsel.
FED. R. CRiM. P. l1(e), as amended by Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Amend-
ments Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-64, § 3(6)-(10), 89 Stat. 371-72. Subdivisions
(1) through (5) of Rule 11(e) became effective Dec. 1, 1975, while subdivision (6)
went into effect on Aug. 1, 1975. Id. § 2, 89 Stat. 370.
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efforts to reduce the cost of legal services for those above the poverty
level but still unable to afford necessary legal help, have also been
part of the effort to equalize the position of low income individuals in
the adversary system."' The fact remains that under the system as it
is constituted, poor and lower middle income Americans really cannot
be adversaries equal to their government or wealthier individuals. A
typical example is the motions practice in a criminal case for which
there is often a substantial attorney's fee. Motion papers for severance
of defendants and counts, to find the particular statute unconstitu-
tional, and to suppress evidence may fill hundreds of pages. Such mo-
tions are possible in every criminal case, but the legal and financial
ability to produce them is not.
Recently, the profession has taken substantial steps towards pro-
viding legal services to low and middle income individuals by means
111. According to former American Bar Association President Chesterfield H.
Smith, those 80% to 85% of the American people above the poverty level but below
the wealthy category have the least access to legal services. 18 AM. B. NEWS, Nov.,
1973, at 3. See REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND
THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 7-8 (1963); Kamisar & Choper,
The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observa-
tions, 48 MINN. L. REV. 1, 22-23 (1963); Tunney, supra note I, at 6, col. 1. Suggested
means of making legal services available at prices the middle class can afford are
specialization, lawyer referral services, legal clinics, prepaid legal insurance, and
standardization of agreements in the areas of landlord and tenant, credit and lending,
and probate. 18 AM. B. NEws, Nov., 1973, at 2; Tunney, supra note 1, at 6, col. 3.
As one distinguished group has concluded:
The essence of the adversary system is challenge. The survival of our system of
criminal justice and the values which it advances depends upon a constant, search-
ing, and creative questioning of official decisions and assertions of authority at all
stages of the process .... It follows that insofar as the financial status of the ac-
cused impedes vigorous and proper challenges, it constitutes a threat to the viabil-
ity of the adversary system.
REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE, supra at 10.
The awareness that the adversary system cannot function properly unless indigents
are provided with at least a minimum of legal weapons to combat the arsenal avail-
able to the government and wealthier private litigants has manifested itself on a num-
ber of fronts. The Supreme Court has held that indigents are entitled to court-appointed
counsel at the trial level [Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (federal); Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (state)], a free transcript [Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12, 19 (1955) ("There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man
gets depends on the amount of money he has.")], and counsel on non-discretionary
appeals [Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)]. It has been argued that indi-
gents should be entitled to free expert witnesses where such experts are, in the words
of 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1)&(2) (1970), "necessary for an adequate defense." See,
e.g., Kamisar & Choper, supra at 7-9 (1963); Timbers, Judicial Perspectives on the
Operation of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 42 N.Y.U.L. REV. 55, 60-61 (1967).
A number of courts have so held, e.g., People v. Watson, 36 I1l. 2d 228, 221 N.E.2d
645, 648-49 (1966); United States v. Hathcock, 441 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971) (inter-
preting FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(b)).
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of changes in ethical and common law rules concerning advertising,
solicitation, and creation of improved low-cost legal service offices.
The new Legal Services Corporation Act' 12 is a promising effort in
this direction. But it is clear that adoption of the adversary model
necessarily implies a commitment to ensuring the equality of the ad-
versaries. Without this commitment, indigent litigants will be no better
off under a true adversary model than they are under the existing situa-
tion model.
It should be noted, however, that under the present system, at least
with respect to criminal prosecutions, absolute adversariness is not
always the goal and is in many instances constitutionally impermis-
sible. The prosecutor's primary duty "is not to convict, but to see that
justice is done." 1 3 Therefore he may not act as an equal adversary,
employing all valid means to win a case. A somewhat different set of
considerations is applied in assessing the conduct of a prosecutor than
might be applied to other attorneys, primarily because he is the repre-
sentative of society as a whole rather than a single client. 14
If the system is to be truly adversary, however, and justice can
best be obtained by means of partisan advocates, the prosecutor's dual
allegiance must be kept to a minimum. One way of ensuring fairness
in an adversary system would be to impose upon the prosecutor a
greater duty towards the defendant prior to trial, but permit the same
aggressive partisanship at the trial itself. Before trial, the government
generally has a police and investigative network at its disposal, along
with a large, well-paid staff of attorneys. It also has the force and
influence of its authority in obtaining and interviewing potential
witnesses-a decided advantage over most defense counsel. The prose-
112. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996-29961 (Supp. IV, 1974).
113. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 5. See ABA CODE, EC 7-13. See
also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 79 (1935).
114. In this respect, it has been recognized that
The public prosecutor cannot take as a guide for the conduct of his office the
standards of an attorney appearing on behalf of an individual client. The freedom
elsewhere wisely granted to partisan advocacy must be severely curtailed if the
prosecutor's duties are to be properly discharged. The public prosecutor must
recall that he occupies a dual role, being obligated, on the one hand, to furnish
that adversary element essential to the informed decision of any controversy, but
being possessed, on the other, of important governmental powers that are pledged
to the accomplishment of one objective only, that of impartial justice.
Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, supra note 52, at 1218.
But see Taliaferro v. Locke, 182 Cal. App.2d 752, 756, 6 Cal. Rptr. 813, 816 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1960) ("In conducting a trial a prosecutor is bound only by the general rules
of law and professional ethics that bind all counsel.").
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cutor should therefore have a duty to investigate and disclose exculpa-
tory as well as inculpatory evidence which has been discovered. 115
On the other hand, aside from differences in forensic ability and
preparation, the adversaries at trial have the opportunity of at least
near equality, and the judge is available to ensure that the defendant's
rights are fully protected. 116 Also, at trial it is of greater necessity to
the proper functioning of the system that partisan advocacy fully ex-
pose the arguments and evidence on both sides than that a duty be
imposed on the prosecution to equalize the positions of the adver-
saries. In fact, the courts already have placed greater pretrial responsi-
bility upon the prosecutor. The Supreme Court has held that "the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused
upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either
to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of
the prosecution." ' 1 7 A number of courts have gone further to require
such disclosure whether defense counsel makes a specific request for
the evidence or not.' 18
With respect to trial conduct, as opposed to pretrial investigation,
the prosecutor is not normally held to a higher standard than defense
counsel. If defense counsel acted improperly or presented misleading
arguments, the prosecutor may be permitted to retaliate in kind." 9 In
United States v. Sober,'20 for example, the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit affirmed the defendant's conviction despite allegations
of prosecutorial misconduct, concluding that defense counsel had in-
vited the retaliatory remarks of the prosecutor.' 21 In other words, the
115. See cases cited in notes 117-18 infra.
116. See, e.g., United States v. Curcio, 279 F.2d 681 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 824 (1960) (judge is more than a moderator or umpire); Green v. State, 554
Okla. Crim. 282, 163 P.2d 554, 557, cert. denied, 328 U.S. 870 (1945) (trial judge
has duty to interfere, in interest of justice, if defense counsel negligently or otherwise
fails to protect defendant's rights).
117. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). See Jackson v. Wainwright, 390
F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1968) (prosecutor must disclose eyewitness testimony in conflict
with his case); Ashley v. Texas, 319 F.2d 80 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 931
(1963) (prosecutor must disclose psychiatrist's finding of incompetency that con-
flicted with his and defendant's psychiatric testimony at trial).
118. See, e.g., Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ("A
criminal trial is not a game of wits between opposing counsel, the cleverer party, or
the one with the greater resources, to be the 'winner.' ").
119. See Davis, Limitations Upon the Prosecution's Summation to the Jury, 42
J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 73, 80 (1951).
120. 281 F.2d 244 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 879 (1960).
121. Id. at 251. See People v. Hidalgo, 78 Cal. App. 2d 926, 945-46, 179 P.2d
102, 112-13 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947) ("the record shows that the district attorney gave
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prosecutor was only performing his duty as a partisan advocate in an
adversary system. 122
In part, these rules of trial conduct reflect the belief that the prose-
cutor cannot be expected to act as an adversary and assist defense
counsel at the same time-without any guidance other than his own
conscience. If he helps defense counsel too much, he will face public
criticism and possible loss of his job; if he helps too little, any convic-
tions obtained will be subject to reversal. In light of these alternatives,
most prosecutors choose to play their role to the hilt, leaving it to de-
fense counsel to appeal if desired. Law schools and ethics committees
can advise no differently until the profession first determines whether
a totally adversary system is most desirable, 123 and if not, what spe-
tit for tat") (dictum). See generally Note, The Imposition of Disciplinary Measures
for the Misconduct of Attorneys, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 1039 (1952).
122. See Note, The Nature and Consequences of Forensic Misconduct in the Pros-
ecution of a Criminal Case, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 946, 946-47 (1954) ("the partisan-
ship of the prosecutor, as of any counsel, is important").
An indiciation of just how strongly the belief in the total partisanship of the prose-
cutor has been ingrained in Americans is the reaction to the Supreme Court decision
in Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957). In Alcorta the Court struck down a convic-
tion of first degree murder because the prosecutor had "elicited" inaccurate testimony
from a key witness with knowledge of its inaccuracy. The defendant had claimed to
have killed his wife in a fit of passion after seeing her kiss a man named Castilleja in
a parked car at night. Castilleja testified on direct examination that he had not kissed
the deceased and had had only a casual relationship with her. It was subsequently re-
vealed that he had informed the prosecutor prior to trial that he had engaged in sexual
intercourse with her on a number of occasions and was told not to volunteer any in-
formation about the intercourse, but if specifically asked about it, to answer truthfully.
What is most significant is that the prosecuting attorney in Alcorta was subsequently
recognized as "Outstanding Texas Prosecutor" by the Texas Law Enforcement Foun-
dation "in recognition and appreciation of his signal and matchless contribution to
criminal justice in this state." The prosecutor felt that what he had done was "right
and proper," and that telling Castilleja to volunteer nothing was simply good practice,
taught every day in law school. He feared that the Court's decision threatened to
"wipe out" the entire adversary system of pitting one lawyer against another. Martin,
The Innocent and the Guilty, 223 SATURDAY EVENING POST, July 30, 1960, at 14, 80
quoted in M. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND
THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 52 (1961).
123. The approach to adversariness which treats disputes as a battle or game has
been denounced as both inefficient and unnecessary. Combat is the rule, although it is
often dysfunctional. As one commentator has noted:
There will be absolutely no reason why both sides should not agree to take a cer-
tain action, yet there will be opposition, because the rules of the game permit
opposition. Suits will be delayed because it is possible to delay them; petty rules
will be relied on, because one can rely on them; discovery will be opposed, not
because there is anything to hide, but because the rules permit the opposition.
Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE LJ. 1049, 1060 (1970). Clients
have been led by the adversary system to expect their attorney to play the game to the
hilt, even in those instances where justice would require compromise or conciliation.
Traditional law school curricula foster this attitude in the attorneys themselves, so
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cific rules might be developed to modify it without destroying its effec-
tiveness.1 24
b. Innocence-oriented alternative
The innocence-oriented subclassification to the adversary system
would go further in affording procedural protections to the accused in
criminal cases.' 2 5 The adversary process is primarily concerned with
that efforts to temper the adversariness of the system in the interests of efficiency or
justice meet stiff opposition.
124. With respect to pretrial discovery, for example, it is not enough to tell the
prosecutor that he must turn over evidence which is "material either to guilt or to
punishment." Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Cf. Giles v. Maryland, 386
U.S. 66 (1967). Even the courts have been unable to agree with respect to the mean-
ing of "materiality." Compare Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir. 1966),
with United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1968).
One possibility for resolving this dilemma would be to recognize that full access to
all facts by both parties is not incompatible with full adversariness. Despite initial
resistance to the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. the
Rules have aided in eliminating surprise, avoiding unnecessary delay, and producing
smoother trials with better prepared attorneys-and at the same time, the adversari-
ness of the proceedings have been preserved. This result should be true for criminal
as well as civil cases:
Every one of the many excellent arguments which carried the day for pretrial dis-
covery in civil cases is equally applicable on the criminal side. If the trial is to be
the occasion at which well prepared adversaries test each other's evidence and
legal contentions in the best tradition of the adversary system, there can be no
substitute for a deposition, discovery, and pretrial procedure.
Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure.
69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1193 (1960).
To the extent such a procedure would conflict with the innocence model, a choice
between the two would have to be made. But that choice would have to be specifically
indicated in the Code, possibly by a preliminary statement which would include the
following: "Whenever a particular situation appears to create conflicting ethical du-
ties, that course of action most likely to effectuate the search for truth [or: the adver-
sary system] should prevail." See also note 54 supra.
Further, the Code could be rewritten so that any Disciplinary Rule reasonably sub-
ject to varying interpretation would conform to the system chosen. For instance, DR
7-106(B)(1) could be redrafted to provide that an attorney, when appearing before
a tribunal as an advocate on behalf of his client, has no duty to assist opposing coun-
sel in any way in the presentation of the latter's case. Likewise, the Disciplinary Rule
could be drafted to make the search for truth unambiguously paramount. See generally
Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1057-58
(1975) (proposed draft of "new" DR 7-102); Uviller, The Advocate, The Truth and
Judicial Hackles: A Reaction to Judge Frankel's Idea, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1081
(1975) (proposed redraft of DR 7-102, to provide: "It is unprofessional conduct for
a lawyer to counsel or countenance testimony by a witness in his favor which, although
true in the part stated, omits matters which if stated might reasonably alter the mean-
ing or significance of the testimony.").
125. In some ways the considerations applicable to criminal cases are also relevant
in civil controversies:
[T] here is an element of social condemnation in almost all adverse legal judg-
ments .... To be found guilty of negligent driving or of breaking a contract does
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pitting two adversaries against each other so that the trier of fact can
weigh the issues presented and be better able to render a just and en-
lightened decision. The innocence-oriented model, on the other hand,
is founded upon a series of philosophical and social policy premises
which often render irrelevant the most accurate determination of truth
in a particular case, even by the adversary method.' 26 It is more im-
portant that the presumption of innocence be preserved in terms of its
inherent goals.
The enormous impact which the presumption of innocence has had
on the ethical duties of criminal defense attorneys is exemplified by
the reasons given for representing a person whom the attorney knows
to be guilty. First, "it is said that a man charged with crime should not
have his guilt determined in the privacy of a lawyer's office but in
open court by due process of law."'127 An attorney who prejudges his
client negates the function of the adversary system: to have judgment
rendered on the basis of the facts brought out by partisan advocacy on
both sides of the issue.
Second, as indicated previously, a criminal trial is primarily an oc-
casion for the prosecutor to attempt to prove the accused's guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt. The defendant is not required to do any-
thing or prove anything-not even to his attorney. Further, one
cannot be guilty of a particular crime in the legal sense unless con-
victed by a judge or jury. Until then the defendant has merely com-
not carry the stigma of a criminal conviction, but in these cases, too, society must
be concerned that even the qualified condemnation implied in an adverse civil
judgment should not be visited on one who has not had a chance to present his
case fully.
Fuller, supra note 77, at 38-39. Since the proponents of the innocence model have
defined it for the most part in terms of the defendant in a criminal case, it will be so
treated in this part of the article.
126. See, e.g., People v. Beige, 83 Misc. 2d 186, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798 (1975), wherein
the court stated:
A trial is in part a search for truth, but it is only partly a search for truth. The
mantle of innocence is flung over the defendant to such an extent that he is safe-
guarded by rules of evidence which frequently keep out absolute truth, much to
the chagrin of juries. Nevertheless, this has been a part of our system since our
laws were taken from the laws of England and over these many years has been
found to best protect a balance between the rights of the individual and the rights
of society.
Id. at 189, 372 N.Y.S.2dat 801.
127. Fuller, supra note 77, at 33. See also M. ScHWARTz, supra note 122, at 86;
Preamble to NEW YORK COUNTY CRIMINAL COURTS BAR Ass'N CODE OF ETHICS AND
PRINCIPLES FOR THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES (adopted May 9,
1941), reproduced and discussed in Daru, The Code of Ethics and Principles for the
Prosecution and Defense of Criminal Cases, 6 ALA. LAW. 39, 49-54, at 49-50 (1945).
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mitted an act which may or may not subject him to penal sanctions.
The defendant in Johns v. Smyth 128 appeared to his attorney to be
guilty of murder. In fact, he had killed a fellow prison inmate. How-
ever, under the law he could have been insane or acting in self-de-
fense, and thus have been legally innocent, or he might have had a
partial justification or excuse, making him guilty only of the lesser
charge of manslaughter. One charged with murder for performing an
abortion may be morally "guilty" under some religious and philosoph-
ical beliefs, but if a fetus is not deemed to be a "person," the accused
would not be legally guilty of murder. 129 Juries also have the power to
nullify laws by taking into account mitigating factors such as changed
societal norms and the character of the accused. One who commits
euthanasia, for instance, is entitled to have the jury acquit him be-
cause it does not believe him to be culpable under prevailing notions
of justice.' 30 All of these considerations require that an attorney de-
fend his client as if innocent until the prosecutor proves and the jury
finds otherwise.
Third, appearances can be deceiving. There are many proved in-
stances where one accused of a crime appeared plainly guilty "until
the patiently turning wheels of justice disclosed his innocence."' 131
Even confessions are often unreliable. Innocent people confess out of
fear, resignation due to guilt concerning related or unrelated acts, the
desire for notoriety, or to protect a relative or friend.
Finally, and most importantly, the lawyer's role, as dictated by the
presumption of innocence, is based on the premise that the preserva-
tion of the system is more important than the conviction or acquittal
of any one individual: that it operates not just to protect the innocent,
"but because we have made a value judgment that the rights of the
individual are just more important than sending him to jail because
he has committed a crime." 132 The resources of the state are all
128. 176 F. Supp. 949 (E.D.) Va. 1959). See notes 67-69 and accompanying text
supra.
129. See Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481
(1970) (fetus held not a "human being" for purposes of murder statute).
130. As stated by Justice Harlan: "A jury may, at times, afford a higher justice by
refusing to enforce harsh laws .... Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 187 (1968)
(dissenting opinion).
13 1. Fuller, supra note 77, at 33-34. For collections of cases involving erroneous
convictions of persons whose guilt seemed clear see E. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE IN-
NOCENT (1932), and J. FRANK & B. FRANK, NOT GUILTY (1957).
132. M. SCHWARTZ, supra note 122, at 84. See Fuller, supra note 77, at 35: "The
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brought to bear upon the accused in an effort to prove his guilt. The
integrity and fairness of the system require that one "learned friend"'
133
represent his client, and without prejudgment as to guilt. Above all,
it is essential that the defense attorney respect his duty to his client,
for. the accused has no one else. Unlike the adversary model, the
innocence model is premised on the belief that it is better that ten
guilty persons shall go free than that one innocent person shall be
punished. The system is thus willing to subvert the truth and let indi-
viduals whom we know to be guilty escape punishment so that future
defendants will be better protected.
An attorney therefore can find that it is his ethical duty, under the
innocence-oriented view, to defend fully and enthusiastically an ac-
cused whom he believes to be guilty. He may hold judgment in abey-
ance until the trier of fact determines guilt or innocence, 34 convince
himself of his client's innocence simply by constant investigation and
argument to prove that innocence,13 5 or treat the process as a game
which, so long as he plays by the rules, it is his job to win.' 3 6
If the innocence model is to serve as a viable instrument of criminal
justice, however, its purpose and rationale must constantly be ex-
plained to the public to avoid the appearance of unethical conduct
and misunderstanding of the lawyer's duty to his client.137 The inno-
purpose of the rule is to preserve the integrity of society itself. It aims at keeping sound
and wholesome the procedures by which society visits its condemnation on an erring
member."
133. The phrase is that of Professor Louis B. Schwartz, University of Pennsylvania
Law School, but the so-called "alter-ego" theory of criminal defense has a number of
proponents. See, e.g., Curtis, supra note 64, at 18, 20; ABA STANDARDS, supra note 52,
at 110 ("a single voice on which [the accused] must be able to rely").
134. "A client is entitled to say to his counsel: I want your advocacy, not your
judgment; I prefer that of the Court." Baron Bramwell in Johnson v. Emerson, [ 1871]
L.R. 6 Ex. 329, 367. See also 2 J. BOSWELL, THE LIFE OF JOHNSON 47 (G. Hill ed., L.
Powell rev. 1934); H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 142-45 (1953); Orkin, Defence of One
Known to be Guilty, I CRIM. L.Q. 170 (1958).
135. See Brandeis, The Opportunity in the Law, 39 AM. L. REv. 555, 561 (1905);
Curtis, supra note 64, at 13-14. Anyone who has been assigned to write a moot court
brief in law school or an appellate brief for an indigent defendant knows the astonish-
ing amount of sincerity and devotion to the assigned position that is created, despite
any initial misgivings or disagreement about the position.
136. See G. MURRAY, STOIC, CHRISTIAN & HuMiANIST 108-09 (1940); Curtis, supra
note 64, at 22: "I wonder if there is anything more exalted than the intense pleasure
of doing a job as well as you can, irrespective of its usefulness or even its purpose."
137. A Texas State Bar survey of attitudes towards lawyers indicated that public
distrust of lawyers was in part due to their representation of the "guilty" and the use
of "loopholes" and "technicalities" to win. Rochelle & Payne, The Struggle for Public
Understanding, 25 TEX. B.J. 109, 159 (1962). Jeremy Bentham believed that a lawyer
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cence model does not mean that the attorney should stop at nothing
on behalf of his client because of the presumption of innocence. For
example, former President Nixon's attorney, Herbert Kalmbach, de-
livered hush money to the Watergate burglars, allegedly because he
unquestioningly assumed that the money was for a valid and legal
purpose. Gerald Alch, once Watergate conspirator James W. Mc-
Cord's attorney, delivered messages to McCord that he would be
hearing from "a friend." The "friend" turned out to be former White
House aide, John J. Caulfield, and the messages consisted of offers of
executive clemency in exchange for McCord's silence. When asked by
the Senate Watergate Committee's chief Republican counsel why he
failed to find out who was contacting his client and for what purposes,
Alch responded that he assumed that no wrongdoing was involved.138
These are instances of the failure to promote the proper functioning
of attorneys under the innocence model. Mr. Kalmbach performed
acts outside his role as an attorney for his client. He therefore had the
same duty as any other citizen to assure himself that his conduct was
legal. Similarly, although Mr. Alch was entitled under the innocence
model to assume that his client was not using him, if the secretive na-
ture of the conversations implied wrongdoing, he had a duty to inves-
tigate and counsel his client to avoid illegal action. The innocence
model would not alter that duty.
whose representation enabled a client whom he knew to be guilty to escape punish-
ment was virtually an accessory after the fact to the crime. 7 THE WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM 474 (J. Bowring ed. 1843). This view is not outdated and not limited to
laymen. Note, e.g., the remarks of a distinguished Canadian attorney:
[W] hile the fairness of criminal trials must be assured, fairness means that the
law should be such as will secure as far as possible that the result of the trial is
the right one; it does not mean that the defence have a sacred right to the bene-
fit of anything which may give them a chance of acquittal, even on a technicality,
however strong the case is against them.
L.P. de Grandpr6 (President, Canadian Bar Ass'n), Criminals Coddled in Court, CAN.
B. BULL., May, 1973, at 3-4, quoted in 19 AM. B. NEWS, Mar., 1974, at 9 (excerpt
from speech given to annual meeting of Atlantic provinces).
Whereas the choice of models might eliminate these criticisms, if the innocence
model is chosen the proper answer to the public's misunderstanding of the lawyer's
loyalty to his client is to better inform the public, not alter the duty itself. The public
must be made to understand the model as a whole and that zealous advocacy is a
necessary part. The "technicalities" (e.g., suppression of illegally seized evidence) also
serve a proper function and were intended to be used. If public opinion were permitted
to set the standard for professional responsibility, no unpopular individual would ever
be able to obtain counsel.
138. Osnos. Watergate Clients' Lawyers Find Themselves Under Scrutiny, The
Washington Post, June 5, 1973, § A, at 4. col. 8. See generally NEW YORK TIMES
STAFF, THE WATERGATE HEARINGS: BREAK-IN AND COVER-UP (1973).
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III. CONCLUSION
The definition and enforcement of lawyers' professional responsi-
bility is in great need of revision. The failure to develop and adopt a
consistent formulation of ethical duty has resulted in a set of ambig-
uous and contradictory rules as well as the inability to impose disci-
pline effectively in all but instances of the most egregious misconduct.
The academic debate has gone on too long. 139 Meaningful choices
regarding systems of defining and regulating professional responsi-
bility can be made. If the legal profession is to continue to be self-
monitoring it must discard the situation-oriented model for one that is
system-oriented. Attorneys must decide what goals are to be given
priority in cases of conflict. If an equal adversary system is the best
means of attaining justice, then all rules of conduct must promote that
system. A true adversary system may dictate that all lawyers be as-
signed to indigents and unpopular cases because the interest in permit-
ting them totally free choice is subordinate to the need for the adver-
saries to be equal. If we are truly to have an innocence-oriented
system of criminal justice, then we must stop treating criminal defense
attorneys as somewhat soiled and instead develop rules which not only
permit but demand that all conduct be consistent with a belief in the
innocence of an accused. An attorney who reveals confidences be-
cause of a perceived duty to the court, or negotiates a plea in the be-
lief that a duty is owed to society to keep the client off the streets, will
be deemed to have acted unethically.
If, on the other hand, we are to accept the search for truth as the
overriding goal of the legal system, then the attorney-client privilege
must be severely limited, the maximum pretrial discovery constitu-
tionally permissible (both civil and criminal) must be required and
enforced, the role of the trial judge must be greatly expanded, and
decisions based on "loopholes and technicalities" must be greatly re-
duced.
It may not be possible to adopt any of the models in toto. It may be
necessary or desirable to adopt a truth-oriented model in the criminal
justice system. Or the attorney as counselor might be required to act
under rules designed to promote the search for truth, whereas the
139. Compare, e.g., Curtis, supra note 64, with Drinker, supra note 62; Burger,
supra note 62, with Freedman, supra note 63, at 1469 n.1; Frankel, supra note 124,
with Freedman, supra note 65.
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conduct of lawyers as advocates would be dictated by the adversarly
principles. Decisions such as these must be made by the legal profes-
sion as a body and not according to the personal balancing test of
each individual member of the Bar. Once the decision has been made,
all attorneys should be bound by their associates' judgment.
For each of the models discussed the primary goal is justice. Often
the models overlap, but always an attorney can resolve doubts by at-
tempting to achieve truth or a fairly balanced adversary procedure, or
treatment of an accused which comports with innocence until proven
guilty. The overall operation of the system can be handled by mecha-
nisms to change particular dysfunctional results. Without some
guiding principle or framework, however, ethical decisions will con-
tinue to be made within the framework of attorneys' individual con-
sciences, and after-the-fact review and discipline will continue to be
both arbitrary and unjust.
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